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For the first part three structural formmodels;Merton’s (1974), Leland –Toft (1996) and
Longstaff–Schwartz(1995);wereimplementedusingdifferentassumptionsforvolatilityand
debtmaturity (i) exogenousvolatility and actual bondmaturity, (ii) exogenousvolatility and
adjustedmaturity, (iii)model determined volatility and actual bondmaturity and (iv)model
determined volatility and adjusted maturity. To our knowledge it is the first time that the
model is calibrated against such four alternatives.Anothernovel featureof ourwork is the
usageofhistoricalimpliedvolatilitywasusedforequity.
ResultswereincontrastwithLydenandSaraniti(2000)andWeiandGuo(1997)whoargued
thatMerton’smodel dominatesLongstaff and Schwartz in predictive accuracy asLongstaff
andSchwartzmodel revealed a very goodperformance.The encouraging results during the
first period (January 1998 DApril 2006) led to a very critical elementof this research– the
implementationoftheLongstaffandSchwartz(1995)modelon2007–2008bonddata.The





































The use of equity implied volatility made a significant impact on the performance of the
model.Also,incontrastwiththeexistingliteratureweseethatthemodelperformedverywell
and in investment rated companies producing amedian predicted over actual credit spread
ratiogreaterthan35%.InadditiontheLongstaffandSchwatrz(1995)isimplementedduring
the 2007 – 2008 credit crisis. The assumption of simple capital structure is relaxed and a
compositeimpliedvolatilityiscalculated.Againthemodelindicatedverygoodperformancein
all cases proving an average predicted over actual credit spread ratio of 57%. Interestingly
thoughtheaveragepredictedcreditspreadwasstillestimatedbelowtheactualoneinlinewith










problemsdriven by the fact that state variables canbeunobservable.Also the convenience




The second approach, developed by Clewlow and Strickland (1999a) and Clewlow and
Strickland (1999b), focuseson theevolutionof the forwardcurve.Thedevelopmentof the
exchangetradedfuturesresultedobservablefuturepricesuptovariousmaturitiesdepending
on theunderlying.The firstnearbycontract isused to imply theconvenienceyield for the
longermaturities.Multifactormodelsforcommoditypricesutilizetheresearchontheinterest
ratetermstructuremodeling. 
The 2 – factormodelwith local volatility developed under this thesis, has the flexibility to
generate different local volatility surfaces depending on the calibrated data. Moreover the
modelallowsdefiningdifferentcorrelationsurface.Themodel isused topriceanumberof
exotic structures–barrieroptions,TargetRedemptionNotes andEuropean andBermudan
Swaptions–thatarecommonintheoilmarket.Basedontheresultsitisclearthatbeingable
tocapturethesmiledynamicsisveryimportantnotonlyforvaluationreasonsbutalsoforrisk
management purposes. The model can be calibrated directly and match market traded
instrumentssuchusswaptionsandmonthlystripoptions.
















timing risk ismoredetailedand specific thanarrival risk.Theunderlyingunknownquantity
(random variable) of timing risk is the time of default, and its risk is described by the
probabilitydistributionfunctionofthetimeofdefault.Ifadefaultneverhappens,thetimeof
defaultissettoinfinity.
Recovery risk describes the uncertainty about the severity of the losses if a default has
happened.Inrecoveryrisk,theuncertaintyquantityistheactualpayoffthatacreditorreceives
after the default. It can be expressed in several ways.Market convention is to express the
recoveryrateofabondorloanasthefractionofthenotionalvalueoftheclaimthatisactually
paidtothecreditor.Recoveryriskisdescribedbytheprobabilitydistributionoftherecovery
rate, i.e. the probabilities that the recovery rate is of a given magnitude. This probability
distributionisaconditionaldistribution,conditionalupondefault.
Market risk describes a different kind of risk, the risk of changes in themarket price of a
defaultableasset,evenifnodefaultoccurs.Apartfromothermarketfactorsthatalsoaffectthe
pricesofdefaultDfreeclaims,marketriskisalsodrivenbychangesintimingandrecoveryrisks,
















The termmarket price correlation risk covers this type of risk: the risk that defaults (and
defaultslikelihoods)arecorrelatedwithpricemovementsofthedefaultableasset.
Whilethearrivalriskandtimingriskareusuallyspecifictoonedefaultableobligator,recovery
risk, market risk and market price correlation risk are specific to a particular payment
obligationofagivenobligator,oratleasttoaparticularclassofpaymentobligations.
If the risk of joint defaults of several obligators is introduced, an additional component is
introduced. Default correlation risk that describes the risk that several obligators default
together. Again here we have joint arrival risk, which is described by the joint default
probabilitiesoveragiventimehorizon,andjointtimingrisk,whichisdescribedbythe joint
probabilitydistributionfunctionofthetimesofdefault.
Froma theoreticalpointofview, it isdesirable to includeasmanyof thedifferent facesof
default risk as possible. This comes at the cost of additional complexity in the model,
implementation problems and slower runtime. Therefore, the first question that should be
answered iswhich risks shouldbe included in themodel.For example, dynamicmodelsof
market risk arenecessaryto riskDmanageandmarkDtoDmodelcreditderivativesand tradeable
defaultbondsonafrequentbasis.Forastaticbookofloansthismaybelessimportantthan
having an accurate model of the default correlations. A second constraint is given by the
availabledata.Ifthereisnodatatobaseasophisticatedmodelupon,asimplerversionshould













Over thirty years ago Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) initiated the modern
analysisof corporatedebtbypointingout that theholdersof riskycorporatebondscanbe



















standard.Regarding thevalueof the juniorbonds theyargued thatcanbederivedfromthe
priceofseniorbondsassumingthattheholdersofjuniorbondswillbepaidaftertheholders








Merton(1974) µ σ= +dV Vdt Vdz  =dr rdt 
BlackandCox(1976) ( )µ δ σ= − +dV Vdt Vdz  =dr rdt 
Leland(1994)andLeland
andToft(1996)
( )( ),µ δ σ= − +dV V t dt Vdz  =dr rdt 
Kim,Ramaswamyand
Sundaresan(1993)
( ) 1 1µ γ σ= − +dV Vdt Vdz  ( ) 2 2κ σ= − +dr m r dt rdz 
LongstaffandSchwartz
(1995)
1 1µ σ= +dV Vdt Vdz  ( ) 2 2κ σ= − +dr m r dt dz 
BriysanddeVarenne
(1997)
( )21 2 11σ ρ ρ= + + −dV rVdt dz Vdz  ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 2κ σ= − +dr t m t r dt t rdz 













:dJ isaPoissonprocesswithintensityparameterλ andajumpamplitudeequalto 0>Π .
Notethat [ ] 1+=Π δE .









the common stocks can be considered as a compound option. At every coupon date, the
stockholdershavetheoptionofbuyingthenextoptionbypayingthecoupon,elsethefirm
defaults to bondholders. The final option is to repurchase the claim on the firm from the
bondholdersbypayingofftheprincipalatmaturity.
HoandSinger(1982)examinedtheeffectofalternativebondindentureprovisionsontherisk
of a firm’s debt under the contingent – claim framework. They examined four indenture





Kim,RamaswamyandSundaresan (1993) insteadofconsidering theassetvalue, focusedon
the cash flow, arguing that the cash flow problem is the source that leads to bankruptcy.
Furthermore, they incorporatedCox, Ingesoll andRoss (1985) framework as the stochastic
process for the default – free interest rate.Under theirmodel the default occurswhen the
firm’s cash flow are not sufficient to repay the interest obligations. If that is the case the
possibilitythatatthetimeofbankruptcythevalueofthefirmcanbehigherthanthevalueof
the remainingdebtobligations isvisible.Longstaff andSchwartz (1995) extended theBlack
andCox(1976)modelbyallowingtheshortDtermrisklessrateof interesttobedescribedby
the dynamics as developed by Vasicek (1977). Furthermore, they assumed that if
reorganizationoccursduringthelifeofasecurity,thesecurityholderreceives1 w− timesthe
facevalueofthesecurityatmaturity.Thefactorwrepresentsthepercentagewritedownona
security. If w=0 there is no writedown and the security holder is unimpaired. If w=1 the
securityholderreceivesnothing.Aconstrainaboutwisthattheaddingupsettlementsonall
classesofclaimscannotexceedK.So therecoveryrate isconsidered likeaboundaryvalue,
rather than exogenously determined. Briys and Varenne (1997) developed a model that is
rooted in the Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) framework by
incorporatinga stochasticbarrier fordefault.When thebarrier isbeinghit thebondholders
receive an exogenously specified fraction of the remaining assets. This ensures that
bondholdersdonot receive apayment greater than the firmvalueupondefault.Moreover,
21
captures theviolationof thepriority rule.Collin–DufresneandGoldstein (2001)extended
theLongstaffandSchwartz(1995)frameworkandtheydevelopedamodelwherefirmsadjust
their capital structure to reflect changes in asset value. Collin – Dufresne and Goldstein
pointedoutthataccordingtoLongstaffandSchwartzframeworktheexpectedleverageratio
should decline exponentially over time. In Longstaff and Schwartz approach is specified a
default boundary which was assumed constant. Since the firm value process follows a
geometricBrownianmotion,theexpectedfirmvalueincreasesexponentiallyovertime.Thus,
ifthedebtlevelisassumedtobeamonotonicfunctionofthedefaultboundary,itfollowsthat
it remains also constantover time, leading to leverage ratio that declines exponentiallyover
time.
Leland(1994)andLelandandToft(1996)developedtheirapproachincorporatingtwomore
aspects.They consideredboth theoptimal capital structure and thematurityof thedebt in
order to examine the debt value and derived endogenous conditions under which can
bankruptcywillbedeclared.Theyendogenizedtaxesandbankruptcycosts,indeterminingthe
optimalassetvalueatwhichthefirmshouldbankrupt.FurthermoreinlinewithLongstaffand
Schwartz framework they assumed that there is a boundary value BV for the firm atwhich
financial distress occurs. However, they have proven that this value is determined
endogenouslyandshowntobeconstant inrationalexpectationsequilibrium.Oneimportant















Merton(1974) F  ( )A TV 
BlackandCox(1976) ( ) ;− −r T tLFe AB  ( )− −r T tLFe 
Leland(1994)andLelandand
Toft(1996)
( ) ( )* , , , ;δ τA TV T a AB 3 ( ) ( )*1− A TL V 
Kim,Ramaswamyand
Sundaresan(1993)
;δc AB  ( )( ) ( ) ( )min 1 , , , − A tL t P r t c B 4
LongstaffandSchwartz(1995) ;K AB  ( )1− L F 
BriysanddeVarenne(1997) ( ),LFP t T 5 ; AB  ( ),LFP t T 











( ) :,TtP isthepriceofadefault–freediscountbondwithsametenor.











For the first timeZhou (2001)within the structural framework allowed the firm’s value to
follow a jumpDdiffusion process. According to this approach the observed spreads do not
reflectonlythecreditriskthatarisesfromthestandarddiffusionprocessofthefirm’svalue,
butalsothecreditriskthatislinkedwithanunexpecteddropinfirm’svalue.Giventheabove,
default can also occur unexpectedly because of a sudden drop in the firm’s value. This
assumptioncanexplainthefactthatthecreditspreadsonshorttermbondsaremuchlarger
than zero. The model appears to have twomain drawbacks. First, as it is pointed out by



































willbe less thanone.Theexchange rate analogy theyusedcanbe interpretedas thepayoff





( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
0 1 0 0
                     if default at time 1  
2





















Using the above they concluded that the risky zero – coupon bond price is its discounted
expectedpayoffattimeT,thatis ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 0 1 1, ,t T p t T E e Tυ =  .Similarapproachisfollowed
invaluingcouponbondssubject todefaultandoptionsondefaultablebonds.Furthermore,
theaboveframeworkwasextendedtoacontinuoustimeeconomy.
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) extended the Jarrow and Turnbull (1995) model by
assuming that the bankruptcy follows a discrete state spaceMarkov chain process in credit
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an absorbing state K. The probability of default, when standing at stage i, under the risk
neutralprobabilitieswascalculatedas ( ) ( ) ( )* , 1 ,it ij iK
j K
Q T q t T q t Tτ
≠
= = −∑   (2.1),whereτ*is
thetimeofdefault.Underthatframeworktheprice ( ),i t Tυ ofariskyzero–couponbond
that is issued by a company in credit class i is given by following
equation ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )*, , 1i itt T p t T Q Tυ δ δ τ= + −   (2.2).
So the credit spread is calculated as a function of the recovery rate δ and the risk neutral
probabilities










Q Tf t T f t T
Q Tτ
δ δ τ
δ δ τ  
 + −
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adefaultwillthenoccurwiththeriskDneutralprobability th t∆ .
The recovery market value is assumed to follow a stochastic process that is given





:L isthelossgivendefault,sothattherecoveryamountgivendefaultis ( )L−1 .
Duffie and Singleton (1999) provided analysis that allows the recoverymarket value to be













































for all time so, theprice of a risklessdiscountbondwith paymentonedollar atmaturity τ
equals ( ) exp( )P rτ τ= − .Assumptionnumber8requiresthatpricemovementsarecontinuous
and their returns are serially independent, which is consistent with the efficient market
hypothesis.












than thepaymentB, i.e. ( )( )V T B> , the firmshouldpay thebondholders and thevalueof
equitywillbe ( )V T B− . If thevalueofthecompanyatT is lessorequal tothevalueofB,









:  the value of the firm
:  the value of the promised payment to bond holders
:  the length of time until maturity
















 Φ = −  
   























:  the ratio of the present value of the promised payment 




























( ) ( )2 22 11 1( ) log , ,R r h d h ddτ σ τ σ ττ
−     
− = Φ + Φ     
(2.6)
( ) :  the yield to maturity on the risky debt provided that the firm doesnot default





















Going a step further and analyzing the implication of the relationship to credit spreads he
concludedthatthecreditspreadsasexpressedby ( )R rτ − aredeterminedbytheratiod,the
σ2andtheτandtherelationsarethefollowings:








As it is clear from the above presentation one of the main drawback’s of the Merton’s
approachinitiallyandGeske’slaterwasthatdefaultisoccurredonlywhenthefirmexhaustsits
assets. Furthermore they assumed that interest rates are constant. Longstaff and Schwartz
(1995)developedanewapproachofvaluingriskydebtbyincorporatingbothdefaultriskand
interestraterisk.Thebasicassumptionsunderlyingtheirmodelarethefollowing:
1. The totalvalueof theassetsof the firmVcanbedescribedby the followingstochastic
differential equation 1dV Vdt VdZµ σ= + where σ is a constant and Z1 is a standard
Wienerprocess.
2. The shortDterm riskless rate of interest r can be described by the following stochastic
differentialequation ( ) 2dr r dt dZζ β η= − + whereζ,βandηareconstantsandZ2isalso
astandardWienerprocess.TheinstantaneouscorrelationbetweendZ1anddZ2isρdt.
3. TheMiller–Modiglianitheoremholds.





5. If reorganization occurs during the life of a security, the security holder receives







( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,P X r T D r T wD r T Q X r T= − (2.7)
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:  the value of a risky discount bond
:  the ratio 
:  the riskless interest rate
:  the maturity date
, exp :  the value of a riskless discount bond Vasicek (1977)
2
η α η α
β β β β
= −
   
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Thefirst term ( ),D r T of theequation represents thevalue thebondwouldhave if itwere
riskless.The second term ( ) ( ), , ,wD r T Q X r T represents adiscount for thedefault riskof
thebond.Thefirstcomponent ( ),wD r T isthepresentvalueofthewritedownonthebondin








Furthermore they extended the abovemodel for valuing risky floating rate payments.They
calculatedthatthevalueofariskyfloatingratepaymentisgivenbythefollowingequation:

( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , , , , , , ,F X r T P X r T R r T wD r T G X r Tτ τ τ= + (2.8)
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
The first term, ( ) ( ), , , ,P X r T R r Tτ , of the equation is thepriceof a riskydiscountbond
timestheexpectedvalueof thevaluerat timeτundertheriskDneutralprocess.Thesecond

















data forMoody’s industrial,utilityandrailroadcorporatebondyieldaverages for theperiod
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1977to1992.Also theycollectedthecorrespondingyieldsfor10Dyearand30DyearTreasury





















( ),dV V t dt dz
V
µ δ σ= − +   (2.9)
:V theunleveragedvalue
:σ theproportionalvolatility











a rate p P T= per year,whereP is the total principal value of all outstanding bonds.The
sameamountofprincipalwillberetiredwhenthepreviouslyDissuedbondmatures.Bondswith
principalppayaconstantcouponrate c C T= peryear,implyingthetotalcouponpaidbyall
outstandingbondsisCperyear.Sothetotaldebtservicepaymentsaretimeindependentand
equaltoC P T+ peryear.
GiventheaboveframeworkLelandandToftproposedthatthevalueofalloutstandingbonds
canbeexpressedbythefollowingequation:
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par, bonds with short remaining maturity sell substantially above par, while bonds of
longermaturity less thanTsellbelowpar.Thisbehaviour reflects the interplaybetween
highcouponrates,thelikelihoodofbankruptcyandtimeremainingtomaturity.
• At theoptimal leveragecreditspreadsarenegligiblefor issuancematuritiesof2yearsor
less,andrisegraduallyforlongermaturities.










issued debt a rise in riskless ratewill tilt credit spreads –will increase credit spreads of
shortertermdebt,butdecreasespreadsforlongtermdebt.














managed to address various aspects of pricing credit risks, the empirical testing of these
modelsisquitelimited.
Sarig and Warga (1989) provided evidence that yields on pure discounts corporate bonds
comparedtotheyieldsofsimilarmaturitypurediscountUSgovernmentbondareactuallyin
line with Merton’s framework. They collected data for 119 US zero coupon governments








bond was subtracted from the yield of each zero coupon corporate bond with identical
maturity.Ifnogovernmentbondwithidenticalmaturityexisted,theyieldsonthebondswith
maturities more closely bounding the corporate bond were interpolated to obtain the
appropriaterisklesszerocouponbondyield.Thesespreadsthenwereaveragedacrossbonds
inagivenmonthandthenacrosstime.
The most considerable feature was the close resemblance of the spreads to the Merton’s
framework. Inmoredetail theyfoundthat thetermstructureofcreditspreads isdownward
sloping for firmswith leverage ratiomore than1, humped for firmswithmedium leverage
ratioandupwardslopingforlowleveragefirms.


















actual and relative spreads became less volatile as maturity increased. Furthermore credit
spreads,bothactualandrelative)arenegativelyrelatedbothwithchangesattheproxyforthe
asset factor (AllOrdinaries Index)andwithchangesat theproxyfor the interestarte factor








funds. Their analysis concluded that the model overpriced the longer maturity bonds and
riskier bonds, i.e. bonds of firmswith high asset variance. Furthermore, they examined the
performance under various parameters and suggested that the performance of the model
differentiatedaccordingtocouponcharacteristics.Themodelunderpricedhighcouponbonds,
morethan7%,andoverpricedlowcouponbonds.Regardingsenioritythemodeloverpriced
junior debt, but provided, on average, good approximation of senior debt.Under a similar
framework they expanded their research on a second paper (1984). Here their sample
consistedbymonthlydatafromJanuary1975toJanuary1981for305bondsfrom27firms.
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Again they allowed callable bonds and sinking fund provisions. They concluded that the
Merton’s framework does not provide any information regarding investment grade bonds
(BBB and above). However, the model performed better in valuing nonDinvestment grade
bonds (belowBBB).Also they foundnegative relation between themodel errors and both




As theyarguedcredit risk isonlyoneof the factors thatare incorporated in theobservable
yieldspreadbetweencorporatebondandTreasuries.Furthermore insomespecialeconomic
situationscreditriskpremiumcanbepotentiallyveryhigh.Sogiventheabove,theiranalysis
wasprimarily focusedonexamininghowmuchof thespread isdue to thecredit riskusing
empirically reasonable parameters. Their study focused in a series of models including
Longstaff’s and Schwartz’s (1995), Leland’s and Toft’s (1996) and Collin –Dufresne’s and
Goldstein’s (2001).Also they developed two new approaches incorporating business cycles








than the bonds face value, which is absolutely in line with the historical average default
recovery rate. Finally the Collin –Dufresne’s andGoldstein’smodel produced results very
close to Longstaff’s and Schwartz’s framework. Incorporating a factor to capture cyclical
market risk premium Huang and Huang found that for investment grade bonds a larger
fractionof theobservedyieldcanbeexplainedbycredit risk, although thatvalue is relative
small(lowerthan25%).Moreover,byallowingjumpsinfirm’svaluedidnotleadtosignificant
betterresultsinrelationtotheLongstaff’sandSchwartz’sframework.






1. Theprincipal is retired atmaturity.Callable, convertible, floatingDrateor sinkablebonds
wereexcluded.
2. The selected bond was the only one outstanding for the issuing company. Issuers of
multiplebondswereexcluded.








debt they examined three different possible structures. Their empirical results were quite
interesting.RegardingtheMerton’smodeltheyfoundthatpredictionsarequitelowinrelation
to the observed ones. The structure that produced the lower spreadwas the one assumed
equalpriority intheeventofdefault.Themeanabsoluteerror inthatcasewascalculatedat
83.10basispoints (or 87.99basispointsonaperDbondbasis)while inother structureswas
85.09basispointsattheonewhereitwasassumedthatprioritywasgiventoshortDtermdebt
(91.33 basis points on a perDbond basis); and 106.97 basis point at the one where it was
assumedthatsenioritytoallotherdebt(109.98basispointsonaperDbondbasis).Thisisavery
important issueas it isnot thecase in“realmarkets”wherevarious seniority structures are









themodel early default, stochastic default free interest rates, correlation sensitivity between
assets value and interest rates and industry recovery rates not only does not improve the
performancebutproducesevensmallerspreads.Withrecoveryrate47.7%andallowingearly
defaultthemodel’smeanabsoluteerrorwas108.73evenlargerfromtheworstestimationof
the originalMerton’smodel (where seniority is assumed for all other formsof debt except
bond,106.97basispoints).Evenchangingthedefaultboundarydoesnotimprovetheresults.





pointsmean absolute error.Given all the above analysisLyden andSaraniti concluded that
Longstaff and Schwartzmodel tends tomagnify the errors, producing lower spreadswhen
Merton’s predictions are low and higher spreadswhenMerton’s predictions are high. That
irregularity maybe is linked to that fact that the sample companies had only one bond
outstanding,soallowingearlydefaulthadnoimportanteffectonbondsvalue.
Teixeira (2005) tested the performance of three structural models Merton’s (1974), Leland
(1994)andFanandSundaresan(2000).Teixeiraincorporatedinhisstudytheindustryeffectin
theperformanceof thesemodels.Furthermorehe tried to solve theproblem that emerged
fromtheassumptionof thesimplecapital structureatMerton’smodeland thecomplicated
capital structures met in the market, using the duration of the bonds as a proxy for the
maturityofMertonzerocouponbonddebt.His sampleconsistedofquarterlyobservations
from 2001 to 2004 for 50 bonds from 6U.S. nonDfinancial industries with publicly traded
stocks.InaddictionhisselectioncriteriawerequitesimilartotheonesfollowedbyLydenand
Saraniti(2000).Sointhesamplewereincludedonlycouponbondswithallprincipalretiredat
maturity andexcludedbondswithprovisions likeconvertible, callableorputable, aswell as
floatingDratebondsorwithsinkingfundprovisions.Furthermorewereexcludedbondswith
timetomaturitylessthanoneyearandbondswiththesamequoteformorethantwomonths.
His findings regardingMerton’smodel are in line with the findings of Lyden and Saraniti
(2000).Merton’spredictionsoverestimatebondsprices andunderestimate thecredit spread.
This conclusion is applied not only in the total sample but also for the industry averages.
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Comparing these resultswith the results fromLelandmodel concluded thatMertonmodel
tendstooverestimatebondpricesmorethanLeland’smodel.Thisunderestimationtendstobe
lessforhighratingcategories,andstrongeramongshortmaturitybondsforMerton’smodel.
Moreover, Teixeira research provided two very interesting results. First, that Merton’s and
Leland’smodelsperformedbetterwhen theywere appliedatmore risky firms, ashe found
extreme underestimation for low volatile firms. Secondly, the sector effect seems to have
relativeimportanceasmodelsseemtoperformbetteronsomesectorsandworseonothers.




that theassumptionof constantvolatility is critical for thepredictionpowerof themodels.
Regardingthebondvariableshefoundthatonlymaturityandyieldtomaturityplayarolein
explainingthespreaderrors.
In contradiction with the above empirical results Gemmill (2002) provided evidence
supportive ofMerton’smodel.Gemmill’s empirical test has an important advantage that is
derived from the sample he used. In particular his sample consisted of zeroDcouponbonds
issuedbyclosedDendfundsintheUKovertheperiodFebruary1992andApril2001.Firstly,
the fact that he dealt with zeroDcoupon bonds allows a direct implementation ofMerton’s
model.Secondly, closedDend fundsarecompanieswithmuchsimpler capital structures than
themostcorporations.Gemmill’sresultcanbedividedintothreeperiods.Theearlyonewhere
market yieldswere significantly less thanmodel yields. The period between 1994 and 1999
where theyieldswere rather similar and theperiodafter theMarch2000where themarket
yields significantly exceededmodel yields. Furthermore in accordance to previous empirical
testshefoundthat themodeltendstounderestimatethespreadforlowleveragecompanies
andaswellasforbondsclosetomaturity.Asfarasitconcernsthedifferencebetweenmarket
andmodelspreadshe found that thedifference isadecreasing functionofmarketvolatility
andinterestratesandanincreasingfunctionoftheclosedDendfundpremium.
Duffee (1998) investigated the relation between treasury yields and corporate bond yield





the treasury term structure. Regarding the corporate bondswith noncallable provisions the
results indicatedthatan increase inthe threemonthtreasuryyieldcorrespondstodecline in
yieldspreads.Thisrelationseemstoholdforeverycombinationofmaturityandcreditrating
andstrengthensascreditqualityfalls.Furthermore,therelationbetweenyieldspreadsandthe
slope of the treasury term structure is also generally negative, especially for longermaturity
bonds. Examining the effects of coupons Duffee pointed out that yield spreads on lower





for shortermaturitybonds aredrivenby the longendof the treasury curve.Moreover, the
sensitivityofacallablebond’sspreadtochangesintreasuryyieldsispositivelyrelatedtothe




toDecember 1998 for investment rating categories –Moody’s ratingAa, A –whichwere
dividedtothreedurationcategories(0to4years,4to8years,8to12years).Bondswithcall
features or other embedded options were excluded. His findings were weaker than those
found by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) for US corporate bond credit spreads and term
structureofUSinterestrates.Inparticular,theseriesexhibitsthatcreditspreadsarewiderfor
lowerDrated bonds and longer duration bonds. Furthermore, examining the volatility of the
credit spreadsduring the secondand thirdquartersof1994,heconcluded that thepossible
presenceofstalepricescouldnotaccountfortheincreaseincreditspreadvolatilityduringthe
1994 bearmarket. Instead, investor uncertainty during this period was likely the cause the
increase in credit spreads volatility.Regarding the relation between credit spreads and term
structure ofUK interest rates it was suggested that there was a weak negative relationship
betweenAaDrated,shortdurationcreditspreadsandtheslopeofthetermstructureofinterest
ratesandaweaknegativerelationshipbetweenAaDrated,mediumdurationcreditspreadsand
the level of the term structure of interest rates. Concluding, he pointed out that the low
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sensitivity of credit spreads to changes in the term structure of interest rates suggests that
creditspreadsoninvestmentgradesterlingcorporatebondshavebeendrivenbyfactorsother
thandefaultrisk.Queriescanberaisedabouthisfindingsasthefactthatincorporatedboth
UK andnonDUK companies in his samplemight have influence the results.Moreover, the
priceswerequotesratherthanactualtradingprices.
WeiandGuo(1997)providedanempirical studyregarding theperformanceofLongstaff–
Schwartz and Merton model for pricing corporate debt and the credit spread. They used
EurodollarsasriskydebtandU.S.Treasurybillsasrisklessdebt.Theadvantageofchoosing
Eurodollarsisthattheyareactivelytraded,sothepricesareactualtradingactionsratherthan
quotes.Theyusedweeklyprices (Thursday’sprice) for eachweek in1992withmaturities7
days,1month,3months,6monthsand1year.Bothmodelsparameterswereestimatedfrom
theobservedtermstructureofrisklessinterestratesandcreditstructuresofriskybonds.Their
findings aremuch in linewithmost of the previous research asMerton’smodel, especially
allowing changing volatility, indicated superior performance in relation to Longstaff –




incorporated changingvolatility inMerton’smodel theperformanceof themodel increased
substantiallyasperformedbetter in fouroutoffivecases.Astheypointoutthefact that in
Merton’smodelthecredittermstructureconvergestoaconstantastimetomaturitygoesto










until the crisis. Regarding the proportion of the default spread they concluded that default
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spreadaccountsfrom5%to22%ofthecreditspread.Thismeansthatthereareothermajor
components that determine the remainder of the credit spread. They studied the role of
recoveryrates,taxes,jumps,liquidityandmarketriskfactors.Althoughtheyfoundthatdefault
spreadisadecreasingfunctionoftherecoveryrate,thisaccountverylittletotheoverallcredit
spread as the probability of actual default is very small for these rating categories. The
difference in tax treatment increases significantly the measures spread but still remains an






risk. When stock market volatility increases the impact is greater on the default spread in
relation to credit spread, leading again to an increase in the explanatory proportion of the
defaultrisk.Ontheotherhand,an increase instockmarket returnsreduces theexplanatory
proportion of the default risk as the default spread is reduced relative to the credit spread.
Finally, thechanges in risk free interest rate are relatively insignificant forAA,AandBBB,
whilehaveimpactonAAAbonds,astheymightbeconsideredasdefaultfree.
InalatterpaperDelianedisandGeske(2003)providedimportantevidencethatbothMerton’s
(1974) andGeske’s (1977) frameworksdopossess significant early information about credit
ratingmigrations.Although their research isnot straightly linkedwith the specificone their
findingsareanimportant indicatoraboutthevalidityandperformanceoftheabovemodels.
UndertheMerton’s(1974)modeltheycalculatedtheriskneutraldefaultprobability(RNDP)
on a debt obligation with maturity date at T and under Geske’s (1977) framework they
calculatedthefollowingprobabilities:a)thetotalprobabilityofdefaultingatbothshortterm
andlongtermdebt,b)theshortprobabilityofonlydefaultingontheshorttermdebtandc)
the forward probability held today of defaulting on the long termdebt, conditional on not






as fornon– investment grade firms,whichhavehigherdefaultprobabilities, aswell as, for
rating upgrades and downgrades. Furthermore, and most important both models produce
defaultprobabilitiesthatareabletoforecastwhichfirmsaremorelikelytoexperienceafuture




ability to produce credit spreads that are in accordancewith themarket, appear to capture
importantinformationregardingtheriskneutraldefaultprobabilities.









that the incorporation in themodel thebond’sprice impliedvolatilityseems to improvethe
performanceof themodel.TheGeske’smodel indicatedsimilarperformancewithMerton’s
one, although itperformed relativebetter at investmentgradeand shortmaturitybonds. In
contrast,withtheabovemodelsLeland’sandToftmodelresultindicatedatendencyforover
predictingbondspreads.This tendencyappearedoneveryversionof themodel.Apossible
case is the fact that the assumption that he firm can continuously sell a constant principal
amount of new debt increases substantially the probability of default. Regarding the
Longstaff’s and Schwartz model their results were supportive to the model in relation to
Merton’s andGeske’s, as thepredicted spreadswere relativehigher.On theotherhand the
absolutespreaderrorsarealmostdoublethoseoftheaboveunderthesamerecoveryrate.The
modelperformedbetterforlongermaturitybonds.Forshortermaturity,upto10years,tend














Bohn (2000) throughhis research concluded that adjusting the spread overU.S.Treasuries
withafactorthatwillcapturethenonDcreditcomponentofthespread,e.g.liquiditypremium,
canprovideconsiderablesupporttothecontingentDclaimorMerton’sframework.Inparticular
he examined 600,000 observations from bonds issued by approximately 2,000 U.S.
corporationsbetweenJune1992andJanuary1999.UsingsolargesampleBohnoverwhelmed
theproblemsthatarerelatedwiththerelevantsmallsamplesizesthatareappearedinsimilar
research. On the other hand, his sample definitely does notmeet the requirements of the
contingentDclaim’sframeworkastheywereincludedbondswithvariousprovisions.Although,
theseprovisionsweretakenintoaccountbychangingthemethodthespreadiscalculateditis








withMerton’s framework, ashigher credit rating firmsdemonstratedpositively sloped term
structureandlower–creditqualityfirmsisappearedhumpedordownwardsloping.
HereitmustbestatedthatFons(1987)usedAaa/AAAratedyieldstorepresentthedefault




default free rate isolated the fact that yield differentialsmay reflect at some proportion the
liquidity andmarketability factor.Throughhis researchhe tried toestablish the relationship
between the riskpremiumrequiredbyholdersof low ratedcorporatebondsand theactual
default rate.His findings indicated that thedefault rates impliedbycorporatebondsreturns
exceedtheactualones,concludingthatthereisarewardforbearingdefaultrisktotheholders
ofthesebonds.Althoughhisresearchinnotdirectlyrelatedwiththespecificonetheabove





of credit spreads (spot rate, yield curve, leverage, volatility, downward jump in firms’ value,
businessclimate)shouldbethenthechangesinthesedeterminantsshouldprovideexplanation
abouttheobservedchanges increditspreads.Theusedmonthlyobservationsof688bonds
with no callable or puttable provisions and maturity more than four years issued by 261
differentissuers,fromJuly1988toDecember1997.Although,allthevariablesarefoundboth





factors, economic state variables, leading effects of stocks on bonds). Again their results
indicated thatevenwith theadditionof thesevariables theexplanatorypowerof themodel
was increased to 34%, implying that credit spread changes of individual bonds are mostly
driven by an aggregate factor. These findings are not in line with the structural model’s
framework, initiated by Merton, which support a relationship that credit spreads can be
explainedinrelationtofactorssuchasleverage,volatilityandinterestrates.
Anderson and Sundaresan (2000) introduced an extended model with the framework of
Merton’s (1974), Leland’s (1994),Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) andMella –Barral and





result indicated themodel inorder toproduce corporate yields that are consistentwith the
marketimpliesextremelyhighvolatilitylevels.Furthermore,thecreditriskcomponentofthe
spreadaccountsforonlyfourbasispointsoftheobservedyieldspread.Theresultsreferringto
Leland’smodel andASTmodel (they namedAST the newmodel that is a special case of
Anderson and Sundaresan and Mella – Barral and Perraudin models), indicated that by
allowingfortheendogenousdeterminationofthedefaultbarriercanleadtoanimprovement
of the structuralmodel.Both the abovementionedmodelsproduced spreads that correlate
more highly, although the difference is not very large,with observed spreads in relation to
Merton’smodelandundermorerealisticvolatilityparameter(especiallyfortheASTmodel).
Arora,BohnandZhu (2005)performedanempirical testof twostructuralmodelsandone
reducedDform model. In particular they tested the original Merton’s model, the Vasicek –
Kealhofermodel–that is thebasefortheMoody’sKMVmodel–andtheHullandWhite
model.AsBohn (2000) they argued that usingU.S. treasury curve for riskDfree interest rate




results arediscussed.Regarding theMerton’smodel their resultswereconsistentwithother
research as indicated that the model systematically underpredicted the actual CDS spread.












testing structuralmodels for corporatebonds is supportedalsoby the findingsofEricsson,
RenebyandWang(2005).Theyarguedthatthebondyieldspreadscompensatenotonlyfor





when they estimate bond spreadswere in linewith relevant research.All the threemodels
underestimated thebondspreads in relation to theactualonesbymore than30%;Leland’s
estimatedmeanspreadwas60bps,FanandSundaresan77bpsandLeland’sandToft112bps,
while the actualmean spreadwas 168 bps.On the other hand, the underestimations were
significantlyreducedwhenthemodelswereappliedtoCDSpremiaforLelandandFanand
Sundaresan, while Leland’s and Toft model overestimated the CDS premia by 8 bps.
Furthermoreoneofthemost interestingof their results is thatallstructuralmodelsresidual
spreads are consistently 60 bps higher than residualCDSpremia.This is supportive to the
hypothesisthatcreditdefaultswapcontainlessofthenonDdefaultcomponentofthespread,
suggestingthatapossibleshortcomingofthestructuralmodels is that theycannottake into
accounttheilliquidityrisk.
Regarding the validity of the structural models in predicting the changes in credit spreads
strong evidence in favour of the models is presented by Avramov, Jostova and Philipov
(2005).Theyuseddatafor2,375U.S.fixedrate,withnoequityorderivativefeaturescorporate
bonds from September 1990 to January 2003. Their result indicate that structural model’s
variablescanexplain67%,54%and35%ofthetotalvariationincreditspreadchangesinlow
–rated,middle–ratedandhigh–ratedbondsrespectively.Theaboveresultsareincontrast
with the results of Jones,Mason and Rosenfeld (1984) who argued that actually structural
modelvariablesexplainonlyasmallfractionofcreditrisk.
Stein (2005) provided some very interesting insight on the incompleteness of Merton’s
framework.AlthoughitsstudyregardedtheabilityofMertonDtypestructuralmodelstoexplain
andpredictdefaultevents,hisfindscanbeveryusefulbothasageneralevaluationofMerton’s
framework but furthermore provide very interesting guidance for how this framework can
improve its performance. As Stein arguedMertonDbased approach is based on two strong
52
assumptions. Firstly, it is assumed that equity markets, on average, contain complete
information about the credit quality of the firm and do not contain nonDcredit related
information. Secondly, theMerton’s framework is the correct onewith which to complete
decode themarket information and translate it into credit evaluations. Stein suggested that
additional variables increase the predictive power of the single factorMertonDbasedmodel.
Even implementinggraphical analysisheproved that addinga single financial ratio, suchas
ROA, can differentiate estimation about the default probabilities. Stein performed a crossD
sectionalanalysisusing20yearsdata,from1980to1999.Thenhetook5Dyearcohortsofdata
starting in1980andestimatedaseries logistic regressions inwhich theMertonvariableand
ROAwereregressedagainstaoneyearflag.Thisflagwasset1ifacompanydefaultedwithin
one year of the observed variables 0 if it did not. That procedure produced a series of 16
cohortsonwhichregressionequationswereestimated.Theresultsprovidedstrongevidence
that ROA adds significantly to the explanation of default, even in the presence ofMerton
variable.This result provides empirical support for the assertion that themultifactormodel
explainsmorethedefaultbehaviourthanthepureMertonmodel.Furthermoreitprovidesan








managed to address various aspects of pricing credit risks, the empirical testing of these
models is quite limited. The most important studies are Wei and Guo (1997), Lyden and
Saraniti(2000),Teixeira(2005)andEom,HelwegeandHuang(2002).
Theprocesswefollowedtodeterminethesample,issimilartotheonesthatwerefollowedby
Lyden and Saraniti (2000), Teixeira (2005) and Eom, Helwege and Huang (2002). To our




















that the incorporation in themodel thebond’sprice impliedvolatilityseems to improvethe
performanceof themodel.TheGeske’smodel indicatedsimilarperformancewithMerton’s
one, although itperformed relativebetter at investmentgradeand shortmaturitybonds. In
contrast,withtheabovemodelsLeland’sandToftmodelresultindicatedatendencyforover
predictingbondspreads.This tendencyappearedoneveryversionof themodel.Apossible
case is the fact that the assumption that he firm can continuously sell a constant principal
amount of new debt increases substantially the probability of default. Regarding the
Longstaff’s and Schwartz model their results were supportive to the model in relation to
Merton’s andGeske’s, as thepredicted spreadswere relativehigher.On theotherhand the
absolutespreaderrorsarealmostdoublethoseoftheaboveunderthesamerecoveryrate.The
modelperformedbetterforlongermaturitybonds.Forshortermaturity,upto10years,tend















Schwartz and Merton model for pricing corporate debt and the credit spread. They used
EurodollarsasriskydebtandU.S.Treasurybillsasrisklessdebt.Theadvantageofchoosing
Eurodollarsisthattheyareactivelytraded,sothepricesareactualtradingactionsratherthan
quotes.Theyusedweeklyprices (Thursday’sprice) for eachweek in1992withmaturities7
days,1month,3months,6monthsand1year.Bothmodelsparameterswereestimatedfrom
theobservedtermstructureofrisklessinterestratesandcreditstructuresofriskybonds.Their
findings aremuch in linewithmost of the previous research asMerton’smodel, especially
allowing changing volatility, indicated superior performance in relation to Longstaff –




incorporated changingvolatility inMerton’smodel theperformanceof themodel increased
substantiallyasperformedbetter in fouroutoffivecases.Astheypointoutthefact that in
Merton’smodelthecredittermstructureconvergestoaconstantastimetomaturitygoesto
infinity in relation to the fact that Longstaff – Schwartz credit term structure converges to
zero,givesarelativeadvantagetoMerton’smodelperformance.
Lyden and Saraniti (2000) tested the performance ofMerton’s and Longstaff – Schwartz’s
modelsandconcludedthat,althoughMerton’smodelunderestimatedsystematicallythecredit
spreads, dominated theLongstaff – Schwartz’smodel in predictive accuracy.Regarding the
Merton’smodel they found thatpredictions arequite low in relation to theobserved ones.
Furthermore their findings indicated that the market overprices the debt of large firms in
relation toMerton’sestimation.Ontheotherhandthelongertermandhighercoupondebt
wereunderpricedrelativetomodel’spredictions.Hereitisverycriticaltostressthefactthat




assets value and interest rates and industry recovery rates not only does not improve the
performancebutproducesevensmallerspreads.Evenchangingthedefaultboundarydoesnot
improve the results. Adding stochastic interest rates produced even larger mean absolute
errors.The sameresultsoccurwhenassumingcorrelationofassetsvaluewith interest rates.
Finally differentiating the recovery rates depending on industry does not provided better
results again.Given all the above analysisLyden andSaraniti concluded thatLongstaff and
Schwartz model tends to magnify the errors, producing lower spreads when Merton’s
predictionsare lowandhigherspreadswhenMerton’spredictionsarehigh.That irregularity
maybe is linked to that fact that the sample companies had only one bondoutstanding, so
allowingearlydefaulthadnoimportanteffectonbondsvalue.
Teixeira (2005) tested the performance of three structural models Merton’s (1974), Leland
(1994)andFanandSundaresan(2000).Teixeiraincorporatedinhisstudytheindustryeffectin
theperformanceof thesemodels.Furthermorehe tried to solve theproblem that emerged
fromtheassumptionof thesimplecapital structureatMerton’smodeland thecomplicated
capital structures met in the market, using the duration of the bonds as a proxy for the
maturityofMertonzerocouponbonddebt.His sampleconsistedofquarterlyobservations
from 2001 to 2004 for 50 bonds from 6U.S. nonDfinancial industries with publicly traded
stocks.InaddictionhisselectioncriteriawerequitesimilartotheonesfollowedbyLydenand
Saraniti(2000).Sointhesamplewereincludedonlycouponbondswithallprincipalretiredat
maturity andexcludedbondswithprovisions likeconvertible, callableorputable, aswell as
floatingDratebondsorwithsinkingfundprovisions.Furthermorewereexcludedbondswith
timetomaturitylessthanoneyearandbondswiththesamequoteformorethantwomonths.
His findings regardingMerton’smodel are in line with the findings of Lyden and Saraniti
(2000).Merton’spredictionsoverestimatebondsprices andunderestimate thecredit spread.
This conclusion is applied not only in the total sample but also for the industry averages.
Comparing these resultswith the results fromLelandmodel concluded thatMertonmodel
tendstooverestimatebondpricesmorethanLeland’smodel.Thisunderestimationtendstobe
lessforhighratingcategories,andstrongeramongshortmaturitybondsforMerton’smodel.
Moreover, Teixeira research provided two very interesting results. First, that Merton’s and
Leland’smodelsperformedbetterwhen theywere appliedatmore risky firms, ashe found
56
extreme underestimation for low volatile firms. Secondly, the sector effect seems to have
relativeimportanceasmodelsseemtoperformbetteronsomesectorsandworseonothers.








Lyden and Saraniti (2000), Teixeira (2005) and Eom, Helwege and Huang (2002). To our
























knowledgeof information that relates to firm’s assets and liabilities. Inmost situations, this
knowledgeleadstoapredictabledefaulttime.Incontrast,reducedformmodelsassumethat




The ideal implementation ofMerton, Leland and Toft and Longstaff and Schwartzmodel
requireszerocouponbondsthathavebeenissuedbycorporationsthathaveonlyonesingle
classofdebtoutstanding.Unfortunately it is impossible to findcorporations thatsatisfy the
above restrictions, so comparisons were made using bonds that have reliable prices and






retired at maturity (bullet bonds) 4) bonds with embedded optionalities like callable,
convertible,putableareexcluded,5)floatingDrateorsinkablebondsareexcludedaswell.









TRAC uses the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) to research corporate
trade data. TRACE data is disseminated to the public via the Bond Trade Dissemination
Service (BTDS) data feed product. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had
approved proposed rules that require National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
members to report secondarymarket transactions in eligible fixed income securities to the
NASD,andsubjectcertaintransactionreportstodissemination.TRACEenablesregulatorsto
oversee the corporate debtmarket and better detect misconduct while improving investor
confidence in thismarket. The above filtration resulted a final sample of 22 firmswith 27
bondsoutstandingfortheperiodfrom1stJanuary1998until13thApril2006.Notethatnodata
were available before 1998while 2006 is the year before the recent credit crisis, somarket






























Dataonbond features,prices andyields are takenfromBloomberg.Thebalance sheetand
equityhistoricaldatafortheabovesamplewereprovidedfromDatastream.Interestratedata












GREATATLA&PAC 7.75 10/07/1997 15/04/2007 Caa1 BD 300,000,000
HUMANAINC 6.3 05/08/2003 01/08/2018 Baa3 BBB 300,000,000
MILLIPORECORP 7.5 01/04/1997 01/04/2007 Baa3 BBB 100,000,000
POPE&TALBOT 8.375 02/06/1993 01/06/2013 Caa1 CCC+ 75,000,000
POPE&TALBOT 8.375 02/10/2002 01/06/2013 Caa1 CCC+ 60,000,000
SPRINTCORP 9.25 15/04/1992 15/04/2022 Baa2 AD 200,000,000
HARMANINTL 7.32 01/07/1997 01/07/2007 Baa2 BBB+ 150,000,000
NORDSTROMINC 5.625 20/01/1999 15/01/2009 Baa1 A 250,000,000
NORDSTROMINC 6.95 16/03/1998 15/03/2028 Baa1 A 300,000,000
NVRINC 5 17/06/2003 15/06/2010 Baa3 BBBD 200,000,000
OFFICEMAXINC 8.25 29/03/1999 15/03/2019 Ba2 B+ 5,000,000
STAPLESINC 7.125 12/08/1997 15/08/2007 Baa2 BBB 200,000,000
SEITELINC 11.75 08/02/2005 15/07/2011 B3 NA 193,000,000
CARLISLECOSINC 7.25 28/01/1997 15/01/2007 Baa2 BBB 150,000,000
CRANECO. 6.75 21/09/1998 01/10/2006 Baa2 BBB 100,000,000
INTLSHIPHOLDING 7.75 27/03/1998 15/10/2007 B1 BD 110,000,000
JLGINDUSTRIES 8.25 08/09/2003 01/05/2008 B2 BB 125,000,000
WORTHINGTONINDS 7.125 24/05/1996 15/05/2006 Baa2 BBB 200,000,000
REYNOLDS&REYN 7 18/12/1996 15/12/2006 Ba1 BBB 100,000,000
TEXASINSTRUMENT 8.75 01/04/1992 01/04/2007 A2 A 150,000,000
CLECOCORP 6.52 07/05/1999 15/05/2009 Baa1 BBB 50,000,000
NICORGAS 6.58 25/02/1998 15/02/2028 Aa3 AA 50,000,000
NICORGAS 6.58 25/02/1998 15/02/2028 Aaa AAA 50,000,000
NISOURCEINC 3.628 01/11/2004 01/11/2006 Baa3 BBB 80,623,000
SOUTHERNUNION 7.6 31/01/1994 01/02/2024 Baa3 BBB 475,000,000
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Under the first approach, the volatility is determined exogenously and is calculated as a
function of the following parameters: the leverage ratio l , the implied volatility from call
options7,aproxyforthevolatilityofthedebtandthecorrelationofreturnsbetweendebtand
equity. Here it must be stated that for four companies (NVR INC, SEITEL INC, INTL
SHIPHOLDING, JLG INDUSTRIES) there was no data available regarding the historical
implied volatility. In the above cases a 90 – day’s window of historical volatility was used.
Giventhefacttherearenolistedtradedoptionsforthesamplebonds,thehistoricalvolatility





of the traded debt was used as a proxy for the volatility of the debt. Also the correlation
betweenthedebtandtheequitywascalculatedonhistoricalreturns.Thevolatilityoftheassets
isestimatedasfollows






Themotivationtousethisapproach isbasedonthefact that if the firm’sassetsarefunded
both by equity and debt their volatility should depend upon both as well as on their
correlation.
The second approach calculates the volatility by solving Merton’s model. In the Merton’s
modelthevalueoftheequityisacalloptiononthefirm’sassetvaluewithstrikepriceequalto
thefacevalueofdebt.ThepayDoffatmaturityis ( )0,max BVE TT −= ,where TV isthevalueof
thefirmattimeTand B isthevalueofpaymenttobondholders.UsingtheBlack–Scholes
formulagivesthevalueoftheequitytodayas




































FromIto’s lemmaweknow that the relationshipbetween theequityvolatility and theasset
volatilityisthefollowing:

























sample, even theyhaveas simple a capital structure aspossible,have several kindsofdebt.
Furthermorethetradeddebti.e.bonds,hascouponswithallprincipalretiredatmaturity.In
ordertomovefromtheavailablecouponbulletbondstoMerton’szero–couponbondsthe
following methodology was followed. As it is already mentioned, most companies in our
sample have one coupon bond outstanding. For these companies all the coupons and the
principal are discounted to time zero, i.e. the issue date, using the relevant risk – free rate.
Thenthesumofthepresentvaluesiscompoundedtothedurationofthebond.Theduration
is used as a proxy for thematurity of theMerton’s zero – couponbond’sdebt.Given the
definitionoftheduration,whichtakes intoaccounttheweightedaverageof thematurityof
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individual category of debt outstanding, two different assumptions were applied. The first




bedeterminedfortheweightedaveragematurityofthe long–termdebt. It isassumedthat





8 Duration is defined as
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:  the value of the firm
:  the value of the promised payment to bond holders
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= 
Tdd σ−= 12 
( )•N thecumulativestandardnormaldistribution.
Oncethevalueofthedebtiscalculatedtheyieldtomaturityiscomputedas 
( )ln D Bytm
T
= − ,






debt in order to examine the debt value.Furthermore, theyderived endogenous conditions
underwhichbankruptcywillbedeclared.Undertheirframework,thefirmcontinuouslysellsa
constantprincipalamountofnewdebtwithmaturityofTyearsfromissuance,whichitwill
redeematparuponmaturity.Newbondprincipalisissuedatarate TPp = peryear,whereP
is the total principal value of all outstanding bonds. The same amount of principalwill be
retired when the previouslyDissued bond matures. Bonds with principal p pay a constant
couponrate TCc = peryear, implyingthetotalcouponpaidbyalloutstandingbonds isC
peryear.Sothetotaldebtservicepaymentsaretimeindependentandequalto TPC + per
year.Ifdefaultoccursbondholdersreceiveonlyafractionofthefirm’sassetvalue.
The implementation of theLeland andToftmodel assumes additional assumptions for the
couponpayment, the payout ratio, the corporate tax rate and the bankruptcy cost. For the
volatility estimation of the firm’s asset we use the same values that were used for the
implementation of Merton’s model. Regarding the coupon payments the model is
implementedundertwodifferentassumptions.Thefirst is the implementationofthemodel
assumingthatthecouponisissuedoverafacevalueofdebtthatequalsto TPp = ,whereP
isthetotalprincipalvalueofalloutstandingdebt,consideringnontradeddebtandtradeddebt




















The bankruptcy cost is determined as ( )raterecovery 1− . The recovery rateswere obtained
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( )tρ : is the fraction of asset value BV which debt of maturity t receives in the event of
bankruptcy.
r :istheinstantaneousrisk–freerate.
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )


































































































































The Longstaff and Schwartz model considers the valuation of the corporate bonds under
stochasticinterestrates.TheinterestratedynamicsaredescribedbytheVasicek(1977)model.
Under their framework there is aboundary valueK for the firm atwhich financial distress
occurs. As long as value V is greater than K, the firm continues to be able to meet its
contractualobligations. IfVreachesK, the firm immediatelyenters to financialdistressand
defaultsonallofitsobligations.
SimilarlytoMerton’smodelthevalueoftheassetsiscalculatedasthesumthemarketvalueof










dynamics of the Vasicek (1977) model. In order to estimate the parameters the model is
calibrated every quarter on the treasury curve. The treasury curve was constructed using
constantmaturityTreasuryseriesthatisbeingpublishedondailybasisbytheFederalReserve
andprovidestheyieldsforfollowingmaturities;1Dmonth,3Dmonth,6Dmonth,1Dyear,2Dyear,3D








( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,P X r T D r T wD r T Q X r T= − (4.10)




:  the value of a risky discount bond
:  the ratio 
:  the riskless interest rate
:  the maturity date
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Thefirstterm ( ),D r T inequation(4.10)representsthevaluethatthebondwouldhaveifit
wereriskless.Thesecondterm ( ) ( ), , ,wD r T Q X r T representsadiscountforthedefaultrisk
of the bond. The first component ( ),wD r T is the present value of the writedown on the
bondintheeventofadefault.Thesecondcomponent ( ), ,Q X r T istheprobability–under
theriskDneutralmeasure–thatadefaultoccurs.
The thirdgroupofparameters is thedefault – free termstructure. Inorder to estimate the
default–freeinterestratecurveconstantmaturityTreasuryyielddatawereused.Theconstant
maturity Treasury series is being published on a daily basis by the Federal Reserve and
provides the yields for followingmaturities; 1Dmonth, 3Dmonth, 6Dmonth, 1Dyear, 2Dyear, 3D






















Clearly by using the V K ratiowe are able to capture both the value of the assets and the
leverage ratio. The reason that the equity implied volatility was used instead of the asset
volatilityisrelatedtothefactthatequityimpliedvolatilityisanobservableparameterwhether













1 CARLISLECOSINC 0.525 0.281 3.879 0.044
2 CLECOCORP 0.751 0.148 1079.511 0.000
3 CRANECO. N/A N/A N/A N/A
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 0.630 0.318 106.568 0.000
5 HARMANINTL 0.943 0.116 4306.031 0.000
6 HUMANAINC 0.682 0.072 57.170 0.000
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 0.127 0.219 2.046 0.100
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 0.777 0.147 27.438 0.000
9 MILLIPORECORP N/A N/A N/A N/A
10 NICORGAS 0.832 0.113 890.566 0.000
11 NISOURCEINC 0.094 0.399 1.685 0.171
12 NORDSTROMINC 0.419 0.105 29.998 0.000
13 NVRINC 0.127 0.131 5.233 0.000
14 OFFICEMAXINC 0.520 0.161 161.853 0.000
15 POPE&TALBOT 0.914 0.122 178.453 0.000
16 REYNOLDS&REYN N/A N/A N/A N/A
17 SEITELINC 0.865 0.059 104.621 0.000
18 SOUTHERNUNION 0.554 0.077 23.096 0.000
19 SPRINTCORP 0.336 0.101 10.807 0.000
20 STAPLESINC 0.046 0.489 2.090 0.072
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 0.899 0.163 3374.293 0.000
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29.309 D3.234 2.653 1.395 D4.862 D0.372
50.462 2.139 1.312 0.867 6.660 1.367
0.581 D1.512 2.022 1.609 D0.730 D0.272
4.522 D0.297 0.255 D0.013 D0.195 0.815
0.392 0.027 0.019 0.010 0.057 0.015
11.533 D10.873 13.637 D1.220 D3.412 54.925
40.978 D1.038 D0.190 D2.053 D2.916 D2.533
9.395 0.208 0.239 0.367 1.161 0.313
4.362 D4.999 D0.794 D5.596 D2.512 D8.102
15.391 D0.368 0.128 0.143 D1.604 0.523
0.256 0.023 0.024 0.012 0.042 0.025
60.105 D15.753 5.386 12.142 D38.039 20.718
15.548 0.112 0.021 D0.634 D0.101 D2.933
3.953 0.097 0.083 0.066 0.463 0.605
3.933 1.158 0.255 D9.580 D0.217 D4.846
56.453 D1.577 0.415 0.483 D7.506 D1.168
20.257 2.325 0.180 1.163 2.756 1.512
2.787 D0.678 2.307 0.415 D2.723 D0.772
27.039 0.310 0.994 1.710 D5.473 2.787
12.544 0.206 0.168 0.596 1.560 0.997
2.155 1.504 5.910 2.869 D3.508 2.794
24.885 0.298 0.297 D0.230 D1.006 D5.087
0.844 0.056 0.030 0.010 0.067 0.227
29.470 5.338 9.946 D23.611 D14.956 D22.397
14.282 1.125 1.167 0.481 D2.416 0.380
38.092 5.532 0.809 2.150 4.464 1.820
0.375 0.203 1.442 0.224 D0.541 0.209
40.363 0.161 0.115 0.030 D3.372 D5.705
4.211 0.056 0.083 0.067 0.455 0.658
9.584 2.856 1.383 0.444 D7.411 D8.665
15.773 0.152 D0.029 D0.357 D0.870 D1.951
4.236 0.068 0.065 0.227 0.609 0.814
3.724 2.233 D0.449 D1.574 D1.428 D2.396
10.382 D1.071 0.133 D0.096 D1.380 2.765
0.776 0.096 0.046 0.024 0.142 0.220
13.381 D11.170 2.858 D3.970 D9.721 12.560
5.489 D0.425 0.008 0.077 1.196 D4.621
4.965 0.375 0.039 0.338 0.685 0.683
1.105 D1.133 0.201 0.229 1.747 D6.766
5.000 D1.168 0.524 0.221 0.214 D1.667
4.325 0.140 0.118 0.182 0.501 0.430
1.156 D8.355 4.425 1.216 0.426 D3.873
14.468 D0.436 D0.033 D0.111 0.105 D3.717
3.444 0.140 0.075 0.096 0.431 0.853
4.201 D3.116 D0.433 D1.167 0.243 D4.357
19.568 D0.291 D0.030 D0.250 D0.585 D3.602
4.181 0.170 0.068 0.088 0.504 0.805
4.681 D1.713 D0.441 D2.852 D1.161 D4.477
8.083 D0.545 D1.004 D1.201 1.277 D0.834
22.272 0.402 0.593 0.784 3.027 1.171
0.363 D1.355 D1.693 D1.531 0.422 D0.713
2.737 D0.355 0.304 0.118 0.091 0.728
0.407 0.012 0.024 0.012 0.066 0.014
6.721 D29.525 12.889 10.017 1.363 51.783
34.218 2.661 D3.264 0.778 D3.820 D0.007
36.828 1.161 1.852 0.996 4.950 0.349




















N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC
N/A N/A N/A N/A3 CRANECO.
N/A N/A
10 NICORGAS
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 0.011 0.011 0.011 112.564 69.798 99.900 0.014% 0.007%
2 CLECOCORP 68.283 91.030 29.303 159.040 55.425 150.600 40.922% 18.846%
3 CRANECO. 267.315 138.079 318.171 66.771 12.700 69.400 422.735% 478.453%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 264.258 196.147 162.455 400.192 213.144 376.100 63.277% 64.209%
5 HARMANINTL 20.532 41.013 0.302 122.326 83.567 81.600 9.564% 0.468%
6 HUMANAINC 3.033 6.082 1.406 171.363 33.744 155.000 1.578% 0.885%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 547.154 36.271 547.883 299.165 73.434 290.900 192.299% 188.697%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 22.430 34.107 0.287 172.664 54.000 159.600 10.257% 0.200%
9 MILLIPORECORP 1.090 1.541 0.543 143.900 134.591 87.450 1.434% 0.534%
10 NICORGAS 47.604 44.688 30.267 261.626 87.962 282.325 17.645% 13.427%
11 NISOURCEINC 351.796 36.314 357.725 46.318 61.883 37.850 816.084% 526.850%
12 NORDSTROMINC 3.197 5.618 0.930 144.326 17.891 144.084 2.160% 0.650%
13 NVRINC 0.058 0.111 0.000 147.937 20.885 143.300 0.043% 0.000%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 36.095 22.697 30.652 352.183 90.620 354.000 11.138% 8.254%
15 POPE&TALBOT 402.086 187.707 385.309 801.859 304.854 820.180 54.702% 49.927%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 0.167 0.337 0.006 115.792 70.811 95.050 0.241% 0.004%
17 SEITELINC 16.507 10.377 13.673 513.579 80.645 512.950 3.104% 3.608%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 13.533 9.669 10.478 218.010 32.283 208.829 6.142% 5.231%
19 SPRINTCORP 8.314 10.123 6.494 244.580 36.447 241.950 3.219% 2.498%
20 STAPLESINC 0.001 0.002 0.000 73.761 56.152 57.600 0.001% 0.000%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 15.433 52.610 0.068 95.512 61.932 118.900 11.272% 0.062%




MILLIPORE CORP, NVR INC, REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS, STAPLES INC, TEXAS INSTRUMENT,
WORTHINGTONINDS.AllthesecompaniesareinvestmentratedexceptJLGINDUSTRIES.Fromtheabovecompanies
HARMAN INTL, JLG INDUSTRIES, NVR INC, REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS, STAPLES INC and TEXAS
INSTRUMENT have a very low leverage ratio (average leverage ratio 11.0%, 8.8%, 10.6%, 11.4% 3.8% and 2.1%,
respectively). Regarding CARLISLE COS INC, MILLIPORE CORP and WORTHINGTON INDS although they have
higherleverageratios(17.8%,17.5%and25.3%respectively),theirbondsarerelativelyclosetomaturity.
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 360.362 79.438 388.874 112.564 69.798 99.900 462.134% 404.334%
2 CLECOCORP 288.062 68.868 301.123 159.040 55.425 150.600 212.224% 159.878%
3 CRANECO. 243.794 3.621 243.191 66.771 12.700 69.400 377.412% 354.064%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 274.459 36.544 265.870 400.192 213.144 376.100 91.760% 70.714%
5 HARMANINTL 482.724 63.139 486.614 122.326 83.567 81.600 702.916% 493.150%
6 HUMANAINC 290.074 52.295 292.171 171.363 33.744 155.000 170.626% 169.083%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 165.107 34.338 163.886 299.165 73.434 290.900 58.266% 53.289%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 243.864 43.016 242.372 172.664 54.000 159.600 149.384% 143.173%
9 MILLIPORECORP 496.234 30.046 505.660 143.900 134.591 87.450 602.669% 581.369%
10 NICORGAS 367.616 57.177 380.575 261.626 87.962 282.325 153.257% 137.080%
11 NISOURCEINC 126.757 37.438 146.935 46.318 61.883 37.850 1007.490% 364.481%
12 NORDSTROMINC 425.984 24.683 430.305 144.326 17.891 144.084 299.486% 293.152%
13 NVRINC 30.025 115.618 1.992 147.937 20.885 143.300 16.393% 1.355%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 243.128 67.102 257.010 352.183 90.620 354.000 70.652% 66.024%
15 POPE&TALBOT 49.211 67.182 35.091 801.859 304.854 820.180 8.907% 4.858%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 448.814 58.737 458.382 115.792 70.811 95.050 555.491% 489.396%
17 SEITELINC 150.811 20.343 155.148 513.579 80.645 512.950 29.570% 29.128%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 427.865 21.036 428.455 218.010 32.283 208.829 199.935% 204.809%
19 SPRINTCORP 695.111 535.083 561.077 244.580 36.447 241.950 271.496% 237.273%
20 STAPLESINC 452.683 38.652 462.932 73.761 56.152 57.600 1311.289% 721.713%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 446.034 107.061 454.041 95.512 61.932 118.900 466.992% 364.003%
22 WORTHINGTONINDS 26.901 134.037 33.116 61.839 50.557 50.200 43.501% 62.665%
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 63.969 23.129 60.062 112.564 69.798 99.900 83.974% 82.045%
2 CLECOCORP 279.679 269.775 186.130 159.040 55.425 150.600 168.587% 113.256%
3 CRANECO. 378.104 138.516 438.012 66.771 12.700 69.400 579.112% 624.979%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 640.292 372.745 487.198 400.192 213.144 376.100 166.479% 170.515%
5 HARMANINTL 125.512 115.750 83.875 122.326 83.567 81.600 116.354% 100.522%
6 HUMANAINC 66.542 22.876 65.410 171.363 33.744 155.000 38.920% 37.716%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 965.336 69.684 973.831 299.165 73.434 290.900 340.492% 336.705%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 96.424 67.723 63.813 172.664 54.000 159.600 52.437% 43.925%
9 MILLIPORECORP 69.191 24.437 60.977 143.900 134.591 87.450 88.035% 81.064%
10 NICORGAS 156.472 124.560 112.357 261.626 87.962 282.325 56.712% 49.460%
11 NISOURCEINC 593.005 41.800 599.469 46.318 61.883 37.850 1280.301% 901.623%
12 NORDSTROMINC 70.457 20.779 68.132 144.326 17.891 144.084 48.677% 46.169%
13 NVRINC 53.881 21.240 49.557 147.937 20.885 143.300 36.481% 35.913%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 241.740 170.505 158.672 352.183 90.620 354.000 74.037% 50.964%
15 POPE&TALBOT 972.871 218.403 1005.667 801.859 304.854 820.180 131.954% 129.226%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 63.902 18.596 57.708 115.792 70.811 95.050 77.916% 64.334%
17 SEITELINC 128.096 58.322 107.635 513.579 80.645 512.950 24.219% 22.804%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 140.371 66.701 125.444 218.010 32.283 208.829 62.507% 60.751%
19 SPRINTCORP 85.203 24.780 81.986 244.580 36.447 241.950 34.971% 35.157%
20 STAPLESINC 70.098 21.623 71.717 73.761 56.152 57.600 188.608% 105.206%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 135.284 96.451 128.526 95.512 61.932 118.900 41.283% 109.445%
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 0.000 0.000 0.000 130.536 63.485 103.400 0.000% 0.000%
2 CLECOCORP 66.028 92.130 18.566 163.556 45.549 154.800 34.660% 13.878%
3 CRANECO. 1.127 0.953 1.157 53.886 12.363 56.300 2.117% 2.056%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 281.490 290.440 103.316 424.795 228.365 392.100 54.488% 48.085%
5 HARMANINTL 16.145 33.553 0.011 174.239 83.064 145.700 6.466% 0.008%
6 HUMANAINC 7.588 7.747 5.639 150.877 20.173 145.100 4.793% 3.768%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 588.279 44.377 592.985 303.973 72.681 295.200 203.801% 196.682%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 8.393 13.046 0.003 176.954 59.181 158.300 3.552% 0.002%
9 MILLIPORECORP 0.005 0.015 0.000 158.817 135.135 100.250 0.004% 0.000%
10 NICORGAS 71.699 43.051 56.011 158.755 40.752 161.050 43.316% 40.051%
11 NISOURCEINC 196.197 95.680 179.402 84.774 55.118 73.000 262.906% 239.740%
12 NORDSTROMINC 4.045 6.619 1.345 137.632 18.665 138.255 2.803% 1.007%
13 NVRINC 0.562 1.037 0.000 141.748 19.579 139.700 0.403% 0.000%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 41.055 23.867 35.294 335.971 78.323 321.650 12.858% 10.485%
15 POPE&TALBOT 397.814 186.370 382.173 801.158 305.726 819.980 54.108% 49.680%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 0.000 0.001 0.000 144.283 74.959 125.100 0.000% 0.000%
17 SEITELINC 16.615 10.391 13.822 513.293 80.449 512.750 3.127% 3.660%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 10.956 5.989 9.344 196.968 22.448 197.241 5.468% 5.024%
19 SPRINTCORP 14.544 13.256 12.881 223.590 27.694 224.400 6.401% 5.722%
20 STAPLESINC 0.000 0.000 0.000 90.637 53.200 74.550 0.000% 0.000%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 11.849 47.695 0.098 112.245 49.036 124.250 7.715% 0.083%
22 WORTHINGTONINDS 0.029 0.053 0.003 80.918 50.116 76.800 0.050% 0.005%
2)07B!! )C+! !<)C+!





< 	.,7.  !9   !9   
1 CARLISLECOSINC 310.240 55.998 323.946 130.536 63.485 103.400 285.793% 286.297%
2 CLECOCORP 157.038 92.289 173.693 163.556 45.549 154.800 106.803% 105.947%
3 CRANECO. 176.092 0.217 176.157 36.200 12.166 36.700 560.442% 479.993%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 346.830 32.529 357.791 424.795 228.365 392.100 103.045% 87.405%
5 HARMANINTL 319.293 71.068 330.402 174.239 83.064 145.700 231.881% 262.734%
6 HUMANAINC 43.238 34.401 50.580 150.877 20.173 145.100 31.058% 36.491%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 317.176 10.269 316.274 303.973 72.681 295.200 109.793% 107.526%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 332.720 24.858 330.954 176.954 59.181 158.300 203.440% 202.887%
9 MILLIPORECORP 310.965 34.677 317.545 158.817 135.135 100.250 317.739% 302.977%
10 NICORGAS D43.858 35.154 D46.594 158.755 40.752 161.050 D31.853% D34.557%
11 NISOURCEINC D11.617 74.086 12.659 84.774 55.118 73.000 D30.945% 10.582%
12 NORDSTROMINC 245.702 49.139 244.412 137.632 18.665 138.255 182.791% 181.725%
13 NVRINC 80.558 30.168 82.657 141.748 19.579 139.700 57.411% 61.160%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 181.658 47.457 201.685 335.971 78.323 321.650 56.679% 54.654%
15 POPE&TALBOT 305.742 114.059 295.916 801.158 305.726 819.980 43.075% 37.152%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 295.888 58.555 294.083 144.283 74.959 125.100 260.067% 246.427%
17 SEITELINC 231.380 39.048 227.601 513.293 80.449 512.750 47.067% 39.395%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 117.436 26.935 116.916 196.968 22.448 197.241 60.309% 61.815%
19 SPRINTCORP 236.258 8.519 237.400 223.590 27.694 224.400 107.086% 105.223%
20 STAPLESINC 280.637 40.553 284.104 90.637 53.200 74.550 390.084% 373.488%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 339.544 130.677 338.589 112.245 49.036 124.250 421.432% 223.283%
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 37.232 25.479 36.545 130.536 63.485 103.400 37.109% 35.757%
2 CLECOCORP 282.925 275.535 196.077 163.556 45.549 154.800 158.219% 113.426%
3 CRANECO. D1.141 3.831 0.232 53.886 12.363 56.300 D3.627% 0.343%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 799.180 747.383 364.203 424.795 228.365 392.100 161.765% 152.991%
5 HARMANINTL 127.614 108.352 96.023 174.239 83.064 145.700 68.955% 61.318%
6 HUMANAINC 76.454 22.261 77.696 150.877 20.173 145.100 50.974% 50.541%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 1208.781 110.922 1205.089 303.973 72.681 295.200 418.683% 406.780%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 56.471 37.967 41.892 176.954 59.181 158.300 29.901% 31.172%
9 MILLIPORECORP 27.409 17.766 20.545 158.817 135.135 100.250 27.622% 28.319%
10 NICORGAS 106.688 79.298 86.101 158.755 40.752 161.050 66.242% 64.926%
11 NISOURCEINC 708.372 146.185 683.635 84.774 55.118 73.000 981.082% 964.630%
12 NORDSTROMINC 69.564 21.261 67.068 137.632 18.665 138.255 50.385% 47.418%
13 NVRINC 69.900 18.896 70.222 141.748 19.579 139.700 49.827% 49.872%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 229.056 165.763 144.556 335.971 78.323 321.650 70.987% 51.854%
15 POPE&TALBOT 951.813 216.891 993.734 801.158 305.726 819.980 129.068% 126.276%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 34.216 27.603 25.477 144.283 74.959 125.100 25.200% 20.693%
17 SEITELINC 129.089 58.362 108.796 513.293 80.449 512.750 24.432% 23.014%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 123.494 41.046 121.434 196.968 22.448 197.241 62.105% 63.497%
19 SPRINTCORP 86.201 23.942 85.764 223.590 27.694 224.400 38.949% 38.355%
20 STAPLESINC 43.007 21.050 39.115 90.637 53.200 74.550 56.379% 51.188%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 130.682 93.052 130.395 112.245 49.036 124.250 117.228% 108.994%






















One obvious result is that Merton’s model clearly overestimates corporate bond prices,
althoughunder theexogenousdeterminedandmodeldeterminedvolatility,Merton’smodel
performedextremelywellonthefollowingcasesGREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC,NICOR




thedebt ismore that10 years seems in favourof using theactualmaturity, rather than the
adjustedone.
Thenextgroupofcompanies ismadebypulling together theones forwhich thepredicted




The model predicts zero or very close to zero credit spread under all four cases for the
following companies CARLISLE COS INC, HARMAN INTL, JLG INDUSTRIES,
MILLIPORECORP,NVR INC,REYNOLDS&REYNOLDS, STAPLES INC,TEXAS
INSTRUMENT,WORTHINGTONINDS.Allthesecompaniesareagaininvestmentrated
except JLG INDUSTRIES. From the above companies HARMAN INTL, JLG
INDUSTRIES, NVR INC, REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS, STAPLES INC and TEXAS






The performance of the model is totally different when it is calibrated against model
determinedvolatility.For INTLSHIPHOLDINGthepredictedcredit spread is zerounder
bothcasesofmaturity.RegardingNISOURCEINC,whenthebonds’actualmaturityisused










that the firm continuously sells a constant principal amount of new debt with
principal p P T= peryear,andpaysaconstantcouponrate c C T= peryear,canresultinan
increase in default probabilities. The average overestimation is more than twice, compared
withtheresultsofEom,HelwegeandHuang(2002).Themodeloverestimatedcreditspreads
in thirteencaseswhen theexogenousvolatility isusedand in twelvecaseswhen themodel
determinedvolatilityisused.Thehighestmedianpredictedspreadis176.157bpsagainstthe
actual36.700bps(forCRANECO.bothunderexogenousandmodeldeterminedvolatility).




spread ratio greater than 35%, for eight companies (GREAT ATLANTIC & PACIFIC,
HUMANA INC, INTL SHIPHOLDING, NVR INC, OFFICE MAX INC, POPE &
TALBOT,SEITELINC,andSOUTHERNUNION).For theabovecompanieswhen the
exogenousvolatility isusedthemedianpredictedversusactualcreditspreadratioisbetween
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 0.000 0.000 0.000 115.271 67.857 100.750 0.000% 0.000%
2 CLECOCORP 102.596 151.293 31.445 159.173 55.005 150.500 59.195% 22.970%
3 CRANECO. 282.356 147.277 336.395 64.486 12.724 66.500 446.426% 505.858%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 105.728 60.965 100.273 404.540 215.804 383.000 28.891% 27.954%
5 HARMANINTL 20.381 41.618 0.243 130.456 82.256 83.800 9.474% 0.373%
6 HUMANAINC 5.731 8.846 3.339 166.741 29.495 153.200 3.062% 2.008%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 0.012 0.043 0.000 300.332 73.199 290.700 0.004% 0.000%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 24.209 36.855 0.298 173.518 54.820 159.500 11.066% 0.209%
9 MILLIPORECORP 0.101 0.140 0.040 144.992 134.564 87.000 0.131% 0.059%
10 NICORGAS 141.761 137.683 86.068 240.438 74.287 257.725 52.926% 39.965%
11 NISOURCEINC 28.642 15.432 24.323 46.344 61.867 37.850 D88.240% 33.821%
12 NORDSTROMINC 3.467 6.174 0.983 142.000 18.105 141.843 2.955% 1.061%
13 NVRINC 0.146 0.275 0.000 147.276 20.405 143.400 0.107% 0.000%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 41.678 39.649 28.805 352.106 90.569 353.850 12.405% 8.294%
15 POPE&TALBOT 253.133 509.405 153.513 801.636 305.132 820.080 32.749% 18.150%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 0.087 0.169 0.004 122.250 72.198 98.650 0.121% 0.003%
17 SEITELINC 12.894 8.504 13.349 513.460 80.561 512.850 2.444% 2.946%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 8.075 7.413 6.304 210.897 27.736 205.989 3.759% 2.913%
19 SPRINTCORP 5.911 9.441 3.111 244.153 36.143 241.750 2.349% 1.297%
20 STAPLESINC 0.000 0.002 0.000 76.884 55.476 59.200 0.001% 0.000%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 15.832 53.700 0.069 99.818 55.863 122.600 11.571% 0.064%
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 360.372 79.443 388.882 112.564 69.798 99.900 462.148% 404.341%
2 CLECOCORP 295.803 71.604 309.238 159.040 55.425 150.600 217.179% 173.900%
3 CRANECO. 243.513 3.516 242.640 66.771 12.700 69.400 377.004% 353.244%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 261.690 64.199 273.093 400.192 213.144 376.100 91.243% 70.648%
5 HARMANINTL 482.556 63.532 485.664 122.326 83.567 81.600 702.935% 493.151%
6 HUMANAINC 289.625 52.135 291.743 171.363 33.744 155.000 170.387% 168.509%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 231.607 37.724 243.280 299.165 73.434 290.900 82.111% 78.280%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 243.928 43.075 242.392 172.664 54.000 159.600 149.417% 143.176%
9 MILLIPORECORP 499.006 32.226 507.142 143.900 134.591 87.450 606.478% 586.260%
10 NICORGAS 355.870 66.137 364.445 261.626 87.962 282.325 146.962% 131.586%
11 NISOURCEINC 207.759 30.835 215.579 46.318 61.883 37.850 448.552% 245.304%
12 NORDSTROMINC 427.177 24.189 431.335 144.326 17.891 144.084 300.291% 294.366%
13 NVRINC 30.024 115.619 1.992 147.937 20.885 143.300 16.393% 1.355%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 247.131 68.821 257.662 352.183 90.620 354.000 71.902% 68.074%
15 POPE&TALBOT 28.557 115.685 2.056 801.859 304.854 820.180 6.200% 0.312%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 449.036 58.971 458.405 115.792 70.811 95.050 555.871% 489.444%
17 SEITELINC 169.005 25.879 174.930 513.579 80.645 512.950 33.006% 32.658%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 449.508 24.921 449.947 218.010 32.283 208.829 209.567% 214.006%
19 SPRINTCORP 834.067 675.376 640.120 244.580 36.447 241.950 324.944% 272.267%
20 STAPLESINC 452.683 38.652 462.932 73.761 56.152 57.600 1311.289% 721.713%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 446.015 107.083 453.916 95.512 61.932 118.900 466.971% 363.812%
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 63.954 23.127 60.029 112.564 69.798 99.900 83.957% 82.018%
2 CLECOCORP 360.760 406.119 197.302 159.040 55.425 150.600 210.221% 119.945%
3 CRANECO. 371.100 139.675 431.279 66.771 12.700 69.400 568.146% 615.946%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 437.730 270.087 377.218 400.192 213.144 376.100 113.520% 116.873%
5 HARMANINTL 117.916 105.592 82.410 122.326 83.567 81.600 112.685% 95.712%
6 HUMANAINC 68.472 23.695 66.355 171.363 33.744 155.000 39.965% 39.692%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 55.567 14.512 52.333 299.165 73.434 290.900 19.057% 18.171%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 95.564 66.607 63.765 172.664 54.000 159.600 52.014% 43.875%
9 MILLIPORECORP 66.779 22.744 59.914 143.900 134.591 87.450 84.772% 79.705%
10 NICORGAS 327.211 308.476 178.261 261.626 87.962 282.325 113.395% 88.866%
11 NISOURCEINC 118.154 38.417 112.106 46.318 61.883 37.850 255.095% 141.339%
12 NORDSTROMINC 69.284 20.621 66.387 144.326 17.891 144.084 47.890% 45.022%
13 NVRINC 53.979 21.201 49.939 147.937 20.885 143.300 36.554% 35.930%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 262.576 220.949 148.918 352.183 90.620 354.000 78.927% 46.800%
15 POPE&TALBOT 700.143 304.810 736.247 801.859 304.854 820.180 89.426% 80.846%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 63.671 18.425 57.580 115.792 70.811 95.050 77.542% 64.261%
17 SEITELINC 75.724 28.900 68.345 513.579 80.645 512.950 14.533% 14.253%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 105.455 51.406 98.089 218.010 32.283 208.829 47.282% 47.205%
19 SPRINTCORP 80.158 24.072 76.901 244.580 36.447 241.950 33.122% 32.033%
20 STAPLESINC 70.098 21.622 71.717 73.761 56.152 57.600 188.607% 105.206%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 135.177 96.384 128.433 95.512 61.932 118.900 41.211% 109.489%
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 0.000 0.000 0.000 130.536 63.485 103.400 0.000% 0.000%
2 CLECOCORP 100.656 152.516 26.698 163.556 45.549 154.800 52.051% 15.607%
3 CRANECO. 1.116 0.946 1.145 53.886 12.363 56.300 2.098% 2.034%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 94.455 101.675 54.111 424.795 228.365 392.100 18.858% 16.657%
5 HARMANINTL 16.020 33.894 0.008 174.239 83.064 145.700 6.427% 0.006%
6 HUMANAINC 13.638 11.679 11.234 150.877 20.173 145.100 8.719% 7.728%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 0.006 0.021 0.000 303.973 72.681 295.200 0.002% 0.000%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 9.014 14.023 0.003 176.954 59.181 158.300 3.814% 0.002%
9 MILLIPORECORP 0.000 0.000 0.000 158.817 135.135 100.250 0.000% 0.000%
10 NICORGAS 170.511 106.745 133.275 158.755 40.752 161.050 103.164% 96.192%
11 NISOURCEINC 1.711 2.951 0.180 84.774 55.118 73.000 1.963% 0.288%
12 NORDSTROMINC 4.377 7.265 1.422 137.632 18.665 138.255 3.701% 1.504%
13 NVRINC 1.102 2.008 0.000 141.748 19.579 139.700 0.791% 0.000%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 46.897 39.672 34.240 335.971 78.323 321.650 14.254% 10.719%
15 POPE&TALBOT 249.811 503.543 151.502 801.158 305.726 819.980 32.314% 17.777%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 0.000 0.000 0.000 144.283 74.959 125.100 0.000% 0.000%
17 SEITELINC 13.000 8.534 13.555 513.293 80.449 512.750 2.467% 2.977%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 6.387 4.956 5.016 196.968 22.448 197.241 3.258% 2.472%
19 SPRINTCORP 11.209 13.392 7.335 223.590 27.694 224.400 5.008% 3.118%
20 STAPLESINC 0.000 0.000 0.000 90.637 53.200 74.550 0.000% 0.000%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 12.164 48.550 0.102 112.245 49.036 124.250 7.921% 0.084%
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 310.240 55.998 323.946 130.536 63.485 103.400 285.793% 286.297%
2 CLECOCORP 154.828 90.835 172.129 163.556 45.549 154.800 105.687% 101.908%
3 CRANECO. 176.092 0.217 176.157 36.200 12.166 36.700 560.442% 479.993%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 337.224 26.366 345.009 424.795 228.365 392.100 101.475% 86.361%
5 HARMANINTL 318.659 71.819 330.277 174.239 83.064 145.700 231.624% 262.736%
6 HUMANAINC 33.969 33.602 39.738 150.877 20.173 145.100 24.740% 28.749%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 296.414 15.629 295.076 303.973 72.681 295.200 102.725% 99.836%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 332.711 24.846 330.954 176.954 59.181 158.300 203.437% 202.887%
9 MILLIPORECORP 310.965 34.677 317.545 158.817 135.135 100.250 317.739% 302.977%
10 NICORGAS D33.764 53.386 D50.504 158.755 40.752 161.050 D28.029% D37.781%
11 NISOURCEINC D11.617 74.086 12.659 84.774 55.118 73.000 D30.945% 10.582%
12 NORDSTROMINC 256.657 47.738 258.288 137.632 18.665 138.255 190.914% 191.537%
13 NVRINC 80.285 30.481 82.641 141.748 19.579 139.700 57.214% 61.159%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 181.652 47.461 201.685 335.971 78.323 321.650 56.678% 54.654%
15 POPE&TALBOT 228.341 205.563 188.705 801.158 305.726 819.980 31.585% 25.004%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 295.888 58.555 294.083 144.283 74.959 125.100 260.067% 246.427%
17 SEITELINC 221.477 50.074 207.161 513.293 80.449 512.750 45.449% 36.482%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 176.677 44.407 179.695 196.968 22.448 197.241 90.250% 90.431%
19 SPRINTCORP 236.283 8.530 237.412 223.590 27.694 224.400 107.096% 105.230%
20 STAPLESINC 280.637 40.553 284.104 90.637 53.200 74.550 390.084% 373.488%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 339.536 130.687 338.591 112.245 49.036 124.250 421.428% 223.293%
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1 CARLISLECOSINC 37.232 25.479 36.545 130.536 63.485 103.400 37.109% 35.757%
2 CLECOCORP 365.447 411.759 211.709 163.556 45.549 154.800 198.764% 122.870%
3 CRANECO. D1.352 3.796 D0.007 53.886 12.363 56.300 D4.021% D0.010%
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 450.362 498.589 212.249 424.795 228.365 392.100 85.861% 70.114%
5 HARMANINTL 120.955 98.416 95.427 174.239 83.064 145.700 66.320% 60.753%
6 HUMANAINC 82.150 24.030 82.655 150.877 20.173 145.100 54.749% 55.362%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING 35.714 12.856 33.314 303.973 72.681 295.200 11.939% 11.801%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES 55.486 36.591 41.892 176.954 59.181 158.300 29.479% 31.165%
9 MILLIPORECORP 27.399 17.752 20.545 158.817 135.135 100.250 27.613% 28.319%
10 NICORGAS 230.603 164.042 167.731 158.755 40.752 161.050 139.610% 131.035%
11 NISOURCEINC 40.261 34.328 39.845 84.774 55.118 73.000 48.851% 36.492%
12 NORDSTROMINC 67.984 20.905 65.345 137.632 18.665 138.255 49.280% 46.126%
13 NVRINC 70.703 18.896 72.357 141.748 19.579 139.700 50.404% 51.426%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 246.483 203.131 137.864 335.971 78.323 321.650 75.244% 48.227%
15 POPE&TALBOT 687.248 298.769 717.321 801.158 305.726 819.980 87.843% 79.366%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN 34.216 27.603 25.477 144.283 74.959 125.100 25.200% 20.693%
17 SEITELINC 76.369 29.048 68.748 513.293 80.449 512.750 14.666% 14.348%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 92.745 33.159 92.068 196.968 22.448 197.241 46.836% 46.506%
19 SPRINTCORP 80.349 26.842 77.227 223.590 27.694 224.400 36.485% 35.180%
20 STAPLESINC 43.007 21.050 39.115 90.637 53.200 74.550 56.379% 51.188%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT 130.592 92.943 130.417 112.245 49.036 124.250 117.181% 108.863%
22 WORTHINGTONINDS 14.490 20.275 11.057 80.918 50.116 76.800 23.497% 14.478%
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WhileMerton andLeland andToftmodel performonopposite directions, namelyMerton
underestimatescreditspreads,whileLelandandToftoverestimatescreditspreads,Longstaff
andSchwartzmodelrevealsaverygoodperformance.Themodelisabletoproducearatioof
the predicted over actual credit spread that is greater than 35% for thirteen companies
(CARLISLE COS INC, HARMAN INTL, HUMANA INC, JLG INDUSTRIES,
MILLIPORECORP,NICORGAS,NORDSTROMINC,NVRINC,OFFICEMAXINC,
POPE & TALBOT, REYNOLDS & REYNOLDS, SOUTHERN UNION and
WORTHINGTON INDS) when it is implemented using model determined volatility and
adjustedmaturity.Moreover,althoughitunderestimatesbondpricesinsixcases,ifweexclude


























ABloomberg searchwasperformedusing the followingcriteria:1) the sample includedUS
non–financialcorporations,2)consideronlyfixedorzerocouponbonds,3)alltheprincipal






time the assumption of the simple capital structured is relaxed. The traded bonds were
identifiedthroughexecutablepricesandtheTRACsystem.TRACusestheTradeReporting
and Compliance Engine (TRACE) to research corporate trade data. TRACE data is
disseminated to the public via the Bond Trade Dissemination Service (BTDS) data feed
product. The SEC had approved proposed rules that require NASD members to report
secondarymarket transactions in eligible fixed income securities to theNASD, and subject
certain transaction reports to dissemination. TRACE enables regulators to oversee the























BOWATERINC 9 09/08/1989 01/08/2009 CCC 300,000,000
ARROWELECINC 7.5 22/01/1997 15/01/2027 BBBD 200,000,000
WITCOCORP 6.875 12/02/1996 01/02/2026 BB 150,000,000
CAMPBELLSOUPCO 8.875 09/05/1991 01/05/2021 A 200,000,000
EASTMANKODAKCO 7.25 10/10/2003 15/11/2013 B 500,000,000
CORNINGINC 6.85 03/03/1999 01/03/2029 BBB+ 150,000,000
KOHLSCORP 7.375 15/10/1996 15/10/2011 BBB+ 100,000,000
3MCO 5.125 08/11/2006 06/11/2009 AA 400,000,000
NSTARELECTRIC 7.8 17/05/1995 15/05/2010 A+ 125,000,000
PULTECORP 8.125 26/02/2001 01/03/2011 BB 200,000,000
SAKSINC 9.875 19/02/2002 01/10/2011 B+ 141,000,000
SONOCOPRODUCTS 9.2 12/08/1991 01/08/2021 BBB 100,000,000
PROCTER&GAMBLE 5.5 27/01/2004 01/02/2034 AAD 500,000,000
STEELDYNAMICS 7.375 12/10/2007 01/11/2012 BB 700,000,000
STANLEYWORKS 5 20/03/2007 15/03/2010 A 200,000,000
DEERE&CO 6.95 17/04/2002 25/04/2014 A 700,000,000
UNISYSCORP 6.875 17/03/2003 15/03/2010 B+ 300,000,000
WENDY'SINTL 7 19/12/1995 15/12/2025 BBD 100,000,000
WALDMARTSTORES 4.5 09/06/2005 01/07/2015 AA 750,000,000

















The Longstaff and Schwartz model considers the valuation of the corporate bonds under
stochasticinterestrates.TheinterestratedynamicsaredescribedbytheVasicek(1977)model.
InthisframeworkthereisaboundaryvalueKforthefirmatwhichfinancialdistressoccurs.






thefacevalueofdebt.ThepayDoffatmaturityis ( )0,max BVE TT −= ,where TV isthevalueof
thefirmattimeTand B isthevalueofpaymenttobondholders.UsingtheBlack–Scholes
formulagivesthevalueoftheequitytodayas




































FromIto’s lemmaweknow that the relationshipbetween theequityvolatility and theasset
volatilityisthefollowing:





















the equity implied volatility we use the composite implied volatility for the stock. The
compositeimpliedvolatilityiscalculatedbytakingasuitablyweightedaverageoftheindividual
implied volatilities. The weights are calculated according to its trading volume and the
moneyness.Heaviestweightingisappliedtothosewiththehighestvolumesandstrikeclosest
tothecurrentshareprice.Theuseofacompositevolatilityhasprimaryimportanceascaptures















Longstaff and Schwartz model indicated very good performance in all cases proving an
averagepredictedover actual credit spread ratioof57%.The results arepresented inTable
4.11. For eight companies BOWATER INC, CAMPBELL SOUP CO, WITCO CORP,
95
STEELDYNAMICS, SONOCOPRODUCTS, SAKS INC,KOHLSCORPandUNISYS
CORP the predicted over actual credit spread ratio was greater than 50%. Five of these
companiesarenon investmentgraded. Importantly thehighmedian ratiosareestimatedfor
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 
1 BOWATERINC 1130.69 51.81 844.68 1300.44 58.41 900.90 87.35% 86.03%
2 ARROWELECINC 76.44 8.87 78.23 253.77 6.69 245.90 28.36% 37.89%
3 3MCO 13.19 0.33 12.85 106.87 1.73 111.70 12.28% 12.28%
4 CAMPBELLSOUPCO 141.97 1.12 141.14 154.28 1.22 159.85 93.09% 93.23%
5 CORNINGINC 59.64 2.35 58.61 181.21 1.42 188.95 32.97% 33.65%
6 WALDMARTSTORES 15.05 0.26 14.94 135.02 1.78 128.60 11.18% 11.13%
7 EASTMANKODAKCO 671.97 10.51 642.58 520.36 5.96 557.65 129.67% 128.74%
8 PROCTER&GAMBLE 19.39 0.62 19.01 104.45 1.35 102.20 18.53% 18.21%
9 WITCOCORP 421.49 6.31 407.67 443.87 4.26 445.10 95.64% 95.14%
10 DEERE&CO 66.44 1.41 63.86 149.73 1.94 152.60 44.53% 44.37%
11 STEELDYNAMICS 336.88 4.29 333.69 415.87 3.60 419.75 81.64% 80.22%
12 SONOCOPRODUCTS 175.30 2.77 172.19 182.98 2.13 175.85 97.39% 98.50%
13 SAKSINC 423.05 6.82 413.73 473.42 5.85 468.95 88.87% 89.28%
14 PULTECORP 341.80 9.71 360.70 313.90 7.90 347.35 109.88% 109.99%
15 KOHLSCORP 107.32 2.68 106.19 201.74 4.02 234.75 53.29% 53.77%
16 XEROXCORP 48.00 1.58 45.47 194.50 2.43 197.35 24.84% 25.29%
17 WENDY'SINTL 85.15 2.56 83.01 460.56 4.70 460.25 18.42% 18.94%
18 UNISYSCORP 311.38 5.70 306.91 388.73 6.08 425.10 80.21% 80.34%
19 STANLEYWORKS 27.23 0.79 25.42 117.08 1.62 126.85 23.21% 22.94%












































































































































cases is increased by the increased equity volatility that these companies indicate. For the
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maturity and finally (iv) model determined volatility and adjusted maturity. The sample
includes only companies with relative simple capital structure and maximum two bonds
outstanding.Theprocesstodeterminethesampleissimilartotheonesthatwerefollowedby
Lyden and Saraniti (2000), Teixeira (2005) and Eom, Helwege and Huang (2002). To our
knowledge, it is the first time that themodels are calibrated against these four alternatives.
Furthermoreitisimportanttostatethefactthatforthefirsttimeintheliteraturethehistorical
impliedvolatilitywasusedforequity.
For the sample 1998 – 2006,Merton’s and Leland and Toftmodels perform on different
directions,namelyMertonunderestimatescreditspreads,whileLelandandToftoverestimates
credit spreads. On the other hand Longstaff and Schwartz model reveals a very good
performance. Themodel is able to produce a ratio of the predicted over the actual credit
spread that isgreater than35%for themajorityof thecompanies.Furthermore,evenwhen




The Longstaff and Schwartz (1995)model is applied also on 2007 – 2008 bond data. The
assumption of simple capital structure is relaxed and a composite implied volatility is
calculated.Theuseof a compositevolatilityhasprimary importanceas captures themarket




predicted credit spread was still estimated below the actual one in line with our earlier













The analysisof the credit – equity relation for any companyhas its theoretical originsover
thirty years ago, when Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) initiated the modern
analysisof corporatedebtbypointingout that theholdersof riskycorporatebondscanbe
thoughtof asownersof riskDfreebondswhohave issuedputoptions to theholdersof the
firm’sequity.Modelsbasedonthisapproacharegenerallyreferredtoasstructuralmodels.The
equitycanbeconsideredacalloptionontheassetvalueofthefirmwithastrikepriceequalto
the value of the liabilities. The Merton’s (1974) framework provided the base for the




simple to model or capture. If a company’s financial condition improves, its equity price
shouldrise,allelsebeingequal,andcreditspreadshouldtighten.Thismeansthatinformation
on a company’s financials should be reflected in both the equity and credit markets. This
shouldallowus tospotvaluationanomaliesbetween thesemarketsanddeterminea trading




equity.UnderLongstaffandSchwartz (1995) framework the totalvalueof theassetsof the
firm V can be described by the following stochastic differential equation
1VdZVdtdV σµ += where µ isthedrift,σ isaconstantvolatilityand 1Z isastandardWiener
100








The specificmodel incorporates stochastic interest rates,which follow the dynamics of the
Vasicek (1977)model, ( ) 2dZdtrdr ηβζ +−= ;whereζ , β andη are constants and  2Z  is
alsoa standardWienerprocess. Inorder toestimate theparameters themodel is calibrated
every quarter on the treasury curve. The treasury curve was constructed using constant
maturity Treasury series that is being published on daily basis by the Federal Reserve and
provides the yields for followingmaturities; 1Dmonth, 3Dmonth, 6Dmonth, 1Dyear, 2Dyear, 3D


















( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , , , , ,P X r T D r T wD r T Q X r T= − 
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:  the value of a risky discount bond
:  the ratio 
:  the riskless interest rate
:  the maturity date
, exp :  the value of a riskless discount bond Vasicek (1977)
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Thefirst term ( ),D r T of theequation represents thevalue thebondwouldhave if itwere
riskless.The second term ( ) ( ), , ,wD r T Q X r T represents adiscount for thedefault riskof
102
thebond.Thefirstcomponent ( ),wD r T isthepresentvalueofthewritedownonthebondin
theeventofadefault.Thesecondcomponent ( ), ,Q X r T istheprobability–undertheriskD
neutralmeasure–thatadefaultoccurs.




Aconceptuallysimpleapproachtorepresenttheweightsequence ( ){ }nini xW 1=   is todescribe
the shapeof theweight function ( )xWni  by adensity functionwitha scaleparameter that
adjuststhesizeandtheformoftheweightsnearx.Itisquitecommontorefertothisshape
functionasakernelK.Thekernel isacontinuous,boundedandsymmetric realfunctionK
whichintegratestoone,i.e. ( ) 1=∫ duuK .
ForoneDdimensionalxtheweightsequenceforkernelsmoothersisdefinedby












1  and ( ) ( )nnh huKhuK n 1−= is the kernel with scale
factor
nh .
Suppressing thedependence nhh =  ofon the sample sizen, the kernelweight sequence is
convenientlyabbreviatedas ( ){ }nihi xW 1= .Thefunction ( )•hf   is theRosenblattDParzenkernel
densityestimator(Rosenblatt(1956);Parzen(1962))ofthe(marginal)densityofX.Theform
ofkernelweights ( )xWhi hasbeenproposedbyNadaraya(1964)andWatson(1964):
























The shape of the kernel weights is determined by K, whereas the size of the weights is
parameterized by h, which is called the bandwidth. The normalization of the weights
( )xf h makes itpossible toadapt to the local intensityof theX–variables and, in addition,
guaranteesthattheweightssumto1.
103
There isasimilaritybetween localpolynomialfittingandkernelsmoothing.Forfixedx, the
kernel estimator ( )xmh with positive weights ( )xWhi is the solution to the following
minimizationproblem
















In this sense, the kernel smoother can be understood as a local constant polynomial fit; it
minimizes, in a neighbourhood around x – determined in a shape and span by the
sequence hK Dthesumofsquaredresiduals.
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1 CARLISLECOSINC D3.656% 2.459%
2 CLECOCORP D0.058% D0.021%
3 CRANECO. N/A N/A
4 GREATATLANTIC&PACIFIC 0.155% 0.559%
5 HARMANINTL 0.182% 0.112%
6 HUMANAINC 1.021% 0.675%
7 INTLSHIPHOLDING D2.268% D0.339%
8 JLGINDUSTRIES D1.889% 0.818%
9 MILLIPORECORP 1.196% 4.205%
10 NICORGAS 0.357% 0.043%
11 NISOURCEINC D0.714% D0.140%
12 NORDSTROMINC 0.182% 0.010%
13 NVRINC 0.407% 0.252%
14 OFFICEMAXINC 0.006% 0.020%
15 POPE&TALBOT D0.673% D1.486%
16 REYNOLDS&REYN D1.365% 0.943%
17 SEITELINC 1.251% 1.275%
18 SOUTHERNUNION 0.171% 0.194%
19 SPRINTCORP 0.348% 0.282%
20 STAPLESINC D0.839% D0.150%
21 TEXASINSTRUMENT D0.033% D0.018%











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Commoditymarkets cover physical assets such as preciousmetals, basemetals, energy (oil,
electricity),wheat,cotton,andweather.Mostofthetrading isdoneusing futures.However,
over the last few years, anOTCmarkethas also beengrowing as an increasingnumberof







• Speculation: trading OTC derivatives, as compared to spot assets, presents many
advantages,asfutures:




• Arbitrage between spot and futures markets: for commodities, the cash and carry
arbitrageismoredifficulttorealizebecauseofstorageanddeliverycosts.

Themotivation to develop to proposedmodeling framework is driven by the fact that the
developmentsoftheOTCmarket,aswellas,thecomplexityoftheproductsrequiredleadthe
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futures curve is very critical in commodity markets as they provide information about the
future expectations of the market participants and views around the future demand and
supply.UndertheRationalExpectationsHypothesis,forwardpriceistheforecastofthespot
priceinthefuture.Thatassumptiondoesnotholdforcommoditymarkets.CrudeOilcurves
typically exhibit one of the following shapes a) backwardation when futures with shorter
maturityaremoreexpensivethanthosematuringlaterandb)contangowhenlongermaturities
aremoreexpensiveversusshorterdatedfutures.Themodelthatcapturesthedynamicsofthe




yield and interest rates.Gibson and Schwartz (1990) presented a two – factormodel with
constant volatility. They assume that spot price and convenience yield follow a constant
correlation joint stochastic process. Convenience yield is similar to the dividend yield and
followsameanrevertingOrnstein–Uhlenbeckprocess.Thespotpriceisassumedtofollowa
GeometricBrownianmotion. Ina laterpaperSchwartz(1997) introducedstochastic interest
ratesasa thirdfactor.Theadditionofstochastic interestrates ispresentedalso inMiltersen
and Schwartz (1998) and Hilliard and Reis (1998) although does not have any significant
impact in the construction of the forward curve. Thismodelling approach, although allows
modelthatgenerateanumeroussetofdynamicsforthecommodityfuturesforwardcurve,has
anumberofproblemsdrivenby the fact that statevariables canbeunobservable.Also the
convenienceyieldcanbenegativeallowingarbitrageopportunities.Finally,thefactthatspot






on theunderlying.The firstnearbycontract isused to imply theconvenienceyield for the
longermaturities.Multifactormodelsforcommoditypricesutilizetheresearchontheinterest
rate term structure modelling. In particular the framework set for interest rates by Heath,






and the correlations of the futures prices. Under that general framework the following
representationisconsidered
( )












where n is the number of risk factors, ( )Tti ,σ are the volatilities of the risk factors and
( )tZ i are Brownian motions. This approach focuses on the martingale property
( ){ } TtTtF ≤, undermeasureQ .
Term structuremodels of commodity prices aim to reproduce as accurately as possible the
futurepricesobserved in themarket.Theyalsoprovideameanfor thediscoveryoffutures
prices for horizons beyond exchange – tradedmaturities. Themain term structuremodels,
from the simplest one – factor models to the more sophisticated, multi – factor models,












that themarket is complete and in suchamarket, a derivative asset canbeduplicated by a








of the futurespotprice.Indeed, thespotprice is themaindeterminantofthe futuresprice.
Thus, most oneDfactor models rely on the spot price. There have been several oneDfactor
modelsintheliteratureoncommodityprices.Thesemodelscanbeseparatedinstepwiththe
dynamicbehaviourthatisretainedforthespotprice.BrennanandSchwartz(1985),Gibson
and Schwartz (1989 and 1990), Brennan (1991),Gabillon (1992 and 1995) use a geometric
Brownianmotion,whereasSchwartz(1997),CortazarandSchwartz(1997),Routledge,Seppi
andSpatt(2000)referthemselvestoameanrevertingprocess.Moreover,themodelscanbe
distinguished in step with the assumption they retain concerning the convenience yield.
Among the different oneDfactor models with a geometric Brownian motion, Brennan and
Schwartz’s model (1985) is the most famous. It has been extensively used in subsequent












the previous variations and the drift µ conducts the price’s evolution. An arbitrage free































costs incurred in transporting a commodity from one location to another, the convenience
yieldmaybethoughtofasthevalueofbeingabletoprofitfromtemporarylocalshortagesof




commodity prices, the geometric Brownian motion is probably not the best approach to
represent thepricedynamic. Indeed, thestorage theoryand theSamuelsoneffect showthat
themeanrevertingprocessisprobablymorerelevant.
Among the different oneDfactor models retaining the mean reverting process, Schwartz’s
model(1997),inspiredbyRoss(1995),isprobablythemostcommonlyused.Inthatcase,the
dynamicofthespotpriceisthefollowing:










twofactors influencethespotpricebehaviour.First, ithasapropensitytoreturntoits long
runmean.Second,itissimultaneouslyvolatileandrandomshockscanmoveitawayfrom µ .
Theuseofameanreversionprocessforthespotpricemakesitpossibletotakeintoaccount
thebehaviouroftheoperators inthephysicalmarket.Whenthespotprice is lowerthan its
long run mean, the industrials, expecting a rise in the spot price, reconstitute their stocks,
whereas the producers reduce their production rate. The increasing demand on the spot
market and the simultaneous reduction of supply have a rising influence on the spot price.
Conversely,whenthespotpriceishigherthanitslongrunmean,industrialstrytoreducetheir





of interest rates.Moreover, the storage theory shows that in commoditymarkets, the basis
does not behave similarly in backwardation and in contango. The mean reverting process
previouslypresenteddoesnotallowtakingintoaccountthatcharacteristic.
The mean reverting process was also used by Cortazar and Schwartz (1997), in a more
sophisticatedmodel.Indeed,theauthorsintroduceavariableconvenienceyieldthatdepends
onthedeviationofthespotpricetoalongDtermaverageprice.
The homogeneity in the choice of the state variables disappears when a second stochastic
variable is introduced in term structuremodelsof commodityprices.Mostof the time, the
secondstatevariableistheconvenienceyield.However,modelsbasedonlongDtermpriceor
onvolatilityofthespotpricehavealsobeendeveloped.Inallthesemodels,theintroduction




Schwartz’s model (1997) was used as a reference to develop several models that aremore
sophisticated(Schwartz(1998),SchwartzandSmith(2000),Yan(2002)).Itis inspiredbythe
























0,, CS σσκ 
In this model, the convenience yield is mean reverting and it intervenes in the spot price
dynamic. The Ornstein – Uhlenbeck process relies on the hypothesis that there is a
regenerationpropertyofinventories,namelythatthereisalevelofstocks,whichsatisfiesthe
needs of industry under normal conditions.The behaviour of the operators in the physical
marketguaranteestheexistenceofthisnormallevel.Whentheconvenienceyieldis low,the
stocksareabundantandtheoperatorssustainahighstoragecostcomparedwiththebenefits




price and the convenience yield are indeed an inverse function of the inventories level.
Nevertheless,asGibsonandSchwartz(1990)demonstrated,thecorrelationbetweenthesetwo
variables is not perfect. Therefore, the increments to standard Brownian motions are
correlated,with:
[ ] dtdZdWE ρ=× 
where ρ isthecorrelationcoefficient.








































































































positively correlated with the degree of backwardation. This phenomenon has been widely
commentedandreported(WilliamsandWright(1991),NgandPirrong(1994),Litzenbergand
Rabinowitz (1995)) and it can be explained by the examination of arbitrage relationships
between the physical and the futures markets. Such a study shows that the basis has an
asymmetricalbehavior:incontango,itslevelislimitedtostoragecosts.Thisisnotthecasein
backwardation arbitrage can always be relied upon to prevent the forward price from
exceeding thespotpricebymore thannet carryingcost,butcannotbeequallyeffective in
preventingtheforwardpricefromexceedingthespotpricebylessthannetcarryingcost.
Furthermore,thebasisisstableincontango,andvolatileinbackwardation.Thisphenomenon
leads sometimes to consider that the convenience yield is an option (Heinkel, Howe and
Hughes(1990),MilonasandTomadakis(1997),MilonasandHenker(2001))orthatithasan






theconvenienceyield.This correlation ishigher inbackwardation than incontango. In this
model, theconvenienceyield is anendogenousvariable,determinedby the storageprocess.
However,itisstochastic.Thetwofactorsarethespotpriceandexogenoustransitoryshocks
affectingsupplyanddemand.LautierandGalli(2001)proposeatwoDfactormodelinspiredby
Schwartz'smodel (1997), where the convenience yield is alsomean reverting and acts as a
continuousdividend.Anasymmetryishoweverintroducedintheconvenienceyielddynamic,
it is high and volatile inbackwardation,when inventories are rare. It is conversely low and
stablewheninventoriesareabundant.Theasymmetryismeasuredbytheparameterβ.When
thelatterissettozero,theasymmetricalmodelreducestoSchwartz’smodel.










interest rates, or prices for renewable energies. Thus, the spot and the longDterm prices






prices for longDmaturity futures contracts provide information about the equilibrium price
level, and differences between the prices for short and longDterm contracts provide
information about shortDterm variations in prices. This model does not explicitly consider
changesinconvenienceyieldsovertime,butitisequivalenttothetwoDfactormodelproposed
by Gibson and Schwartz (1990), in that the state variables in one of the models can be
expressedas linearcombinationsofthestatevariables intheothermodel.Thespotprice is
decomposedintotwostochasticfactors:





The shortDterm deviation is assumed to revert to zero, following an OrnsteinDUhlenbeck



















:χdz isanincrementtoastandardBrownianmotionassociatedwith tχ 
:µ isthedrifttotheequilibriumpricelevel
:ξσ isthevolatilityoftheequilibriumpricelevel
:ξdz isanincrementtoastandardBrownianmotionassociatedwith tξ 
Changes in the shortDterm deviation represent temporary changes in prices (e.g. caused by
abrupt weather alteration, supply disruption, etc) and are not expected to persist. They are
tempered by the ability of market participants to adjust inventory levels in response to

































can be represented by an n – dimensional vector process of state variables following the
diffusionprocess









where α is a function from [ ] +×⊆Α RRn into nR and β is a function from
[ ] +×⊆Α RRn intoasetof nn× ofrealnumbers.
119
Theabsenceofarbitrageimpliesthatthefuturepriceprocesswillbethefollowing


































attimetforthefuturecontractexpiringattimeT ( )TtF , isgivenbythefollowingdiffusion
process:
( )







rate modelling, rather than commodities. The deDcorrelation between future contracts has
muchstrongerimpactincommoditythaninterestratemarket.
The following two general stochastic processes in terms of two independent Brownian
motionsareconsidered:
( )


















, :t tX Y aregeneralstochasticprocesses.
,
:XS tσ isthevolatilityof ( )SW t .
,
:YL tσ isthevolatilityof ( )LW t .
, , , :a b x ρ areconstants.
( ) ( ), :S LW t W t areBrownianmotions.
120
















( ), :F t T isthefuturepriceastimet.
:Ftσ istheinstantaneouslocalvolatility.
, , , :a b v ρ areconstants.




volatility surface canbe estimated at aparticular future time t andmarket levelFusing the
impliedvolatilitysurfaceofstandardEuropeanoptions.DermanandKanin(1994)andDupire
(1994) have shown that local volatility is unique and can be calculated using the price of






where S istheassetvalueandµ isthedrift.Theinstantaneouslocalvolatilityisadeterministic






































For themodel developed at each node ( )jin ,,  where 0≥n is the time step and ni ≤≤0 ,
nj ≤≤0 are the states, the price is assumed to be determined by the value of the factors
tX and tY :
( ) ( )

































( ) ( )( ) ( )













The local volatility jin ,,σ  then can be determined as the annualized standard deviation
at ( )jin ,, .HullandWhite(1994and1996)describetheprocessofbuildinga2–factortree.
Thefirststepistofixtimestep t∆ thatwillbeusedtobuildbothprocesses.ThevariablesX
andYwillbedefinedas:
( ) ( )









where ( ) ( ) ttAtJ ∆= 300 
Nextsteprequiresdeterminingthemaximumandminimumnodeindex minmax , JJ andwhich
branchingmethodtouse:
a) Atthetopnode maxJ 
b) Atintermediatenode
122
c) Atthebottomnode minJ 

Starting with X at a specific node ( )10 −tiJ can move to three possible states:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tJitJitJi 000 ,1,1 −+ withprobabilities du pp , and mp respectively.
Theprobabilitiesarecalculatedbymatchingthefirsttwomomentsofthethreedynamicsto
the first and the second moments of the continuous time dynamics. It is clear that the
condition 1=++ mdu ppp needstobesatisfied.Theequationsare:
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )























Havingdeterminedthe p probabilities,acertaingridpoint ( ) ( )11 21 −+− tjJtiJ canmoveto
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tjJtiJtJjtiJtJjtiJ 212121 ,1,1 +−+++  with probabilities ''' ,, mdu ppp 
respectively.


















 Down Middle Up
Up
du pp
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Because the specifiedbarrier liesbetween twosetsofnodeson the tree, thecorrectoption
valueisregardedastheoneobtainedbyinterpolatingthetwooptionvaluescorrespondingto




 Type Maturity Strike Barrier
StructureE KnockDOut 19DAugD10 50 70
StructureF KnockDIn 19DAugD10 50 70
StructureG KnockDOut 19DDecD11 85 100
StructureH KnockDIn 19DDecD11 85 100
StructureI KnockDOut 19DDecD14 75 85









WTI NYMEX. Target Redemption notes are index linked notes that provide a sum of
coupons until the accumulated amount of coupons has reached a preDspecified level.Once
targetisreachedthenotewillbeterminatedwithfinalpaymentofthepar.
Thenotevalueiscalculatedasthesumofpresentvaluesofthecouponpaymentsandthepar.
As discussed by Brigo and Mercurio (2006) assuming the TARN has a set of payment
times NTTT ,...,, 21 ,acouponc,atriggerlevel A andanoverallsumofcouponsS.Theactual
coupon ( )iTC paidattime iT isgivenby










































































where ( )11 −= orω is used to determine upper (lower) trigger level and where no trigger

























a) Assuming that the target has not been reached Part A will
pay ( )+− iPut iceMonthlyK Pr and ( )+− CallAi KiceMonthly Pr 
126
b) PartyBwillpay ( )+− CallBi KiceMonthly Pr 
c) The target event isoccurredwhenon the firstmonth that theaccumulated coupon
paidisgreaterorequaltoapredeterminedamountS.


















PutK  CallAK  CallBK 
StructureA 30 55 75
StructureB 40 55 65
StructureC 50 65 80
StructureD 60 70 90




















option to sell a similar structure on a future expiry date. A more advanced structure can
involvecallspreadsandmay includeadditionalfeaturessuchthatafterexecutingthetradea
partycancanceltheremainingcashflowsafteroneormorepreDagreedexpirydates.






While European swaptions are straight forward exercise Bermudan swaptions are more
complicated as one has to assess the value of the option to exercise versus the value to
postponetheexerciseforthefuture.
AsdescribedbyBrigo andMercurio (2006), consider a swapwith first payment in αT  and
payingat βα TT ,...,1+ andassumethatonehastherighttoentertheswapatanyofthefollowing
times khh TTT ,...,, 1+ with βα TTTT kh ≤<≤ . For each l , select a set of times
lt  as




l TtttT . Set β=+1l and position in a new time interval
[ ]1, +ll TT and add the remaining cash flows. While going backwards from time lit 1+ to lit ,
propagate backwards the vector of the portfolio prices as follows
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]sl kidsl kimsl kiuttrsl ji TPpTPpTPpeTP lilil ji 1,1,11,1, 1, −++++−− ++= + (6.21)forall β,...,1+= ls .
129
If 1>i thendecrease i byoneandgobackuntil 1=i ,thatimplies l
l Tt =1 .Theaboveprocess
isrepeateduntil kl = thatisthelastpointintimethattheoptioncanbeexercised.Foreach
level j inthecurrentcolumnofthetreethevalueoftheunderlyingportfolioiscalculated.The
backwardly–CumulatedvaluefromContinuationoftheBermudanswaptionisdefinedasthe
valueofportfolioineachnodejofthecurrenttimelevelinthetree.Thenset ( )ldi =+1 and




swap portfolio is given by the same as above formula. The backwardly –Cumulated value
from Continuation of the Bermudan swaption (CC) is given by
( )[ ]l kidl kiml kiuttrl ji CCpCCpCCpeCC lilil ji 1,1,11,1, 1, −++++−− ++= +  (6.22).Similarly if 1>i thendecrease
i byoneandgobackuntil 1=i ,thatimplies l
l Tt =1 .Theprocessisrepeateduntilwereachthe




a) PartAwillpay ( )+− CallBi KiceMonthly Pr and ( )+− iPut iceMonthlyKx Pr2 .


















PutK  CallAK  CallBK 
StructureK 30DSepD10 31DDecD10 40 55 60
StructureL 30DSepD10 31DDecD10 90 105 115
StructureM 30DJunD10 30DSepD10 70 80 85
StructureN 31DDecD09 31DDecD14 50 65 75
StructureO 30DJunD10 31DDecD20 80 85 90

























































































































































































































































D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 8.647 11.401 12.156 12.934 16.239 20.619 25.082
NonDSmileValuation 9.165 11.739 12.423 13.121 16.049 19.975 24.148
SmileValue D0.518 D0.339 D0.267 D0.187 0.190 0.644 0.934
StructureG
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 0.100 0.119 0.125 0.130 0.153 0.187 0.216
NonDSmileValuation 0.097 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.101 0.095 0.086
SmileValue 0.003 0.017 0.021 0.027 0.052 0.092 0.130
StructureH
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 4.391 5.494 5.795 6.108 7.471 9.451 11.779
NonDSmileValuation 4.135 5.378 5.718 6.068 7.583 9.714 12.101
SmileValue 0.256 0.116 0.078 0.040 D0.112 D0.262 D0.323
StructureI
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 0.040 0.039 0.038 0.037 0.029 0.016 0.003
NonDSmileValuation 0.019 0.016 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.006 0.001
SmileValue 0.021 0.023 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.010 0.002
StructureJ
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 10.082 11.876 12.351 12.837 14.877 17.634 20.593
NonDSmileValuation 10.135 11.956 12.431 12.914 14.918 17.574 20.386
SmileValue D0.053 D0.080 D0.080 D0.077 D0.041 0.060 0.207 















































































































































StructureA 7.542 0.362 D5.679 0.243 13.221
StructureB 75.152 0.621 58.611 0.482 16.540
StructureC 211.486 0.739 204.220 0.557 7.266


















D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 23.864 10.458 7.542 4.780 D4.902 D14.566 D22.245
NonDSmileValuation 9.019 D3.112 D5.679 D8.078 D16.320 D24.295 D30.334
SmileValue 14.845 13.570 13.221 12.858 11.418 9.729 8.089
StructureB
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 109.503 81.253 75.152 69.393 49.054 28.537 12.033
NonDSmileValuation 96.893 65.338 58.611 52.323 30.803 10.355 D4.959
SmileValue 12.610 15.915 16.540 17.069 18.251 18.182 16.992
StructureC
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 273.247 222.697 211.486 200.721 162.636 124.259 93.588
NonDSmileValuation 271.853 216.709 204.220 192.262 149.423 106.379 73.094
SmileValue 1.393 5.988 7.266 8.459 13.214 17.881 20.493
StructureD
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 489.183 415.762 398.860 382.482 322.590 259.321 207.002
NonDSmileValuation 494.564 419.788 402.287 385.233 321.548 252.351 194.351
SmileValue D5.381 D4.026 D3.427 D2.750 1.042 6.970 12.652 
TheimportanceofthemodelthatincorporatesthesmileisclearontheGraph5.1belowthat
presents thechangeof thevalueof the structure in relation toprice.The smilevaluation is
clearly capturing better the market dynamics. On the other hand, as expected parallel,





























































































































D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 14.991 19.210 20.215 21.366 25.653 31.054 35.896
NonDSmileValuation 17.249 21.755 22.906 24.156 29.162 35.821 42.937
SmileValue D2.258 D2.545 D2.691 D2.790 D3.509 D4.767 D7.041
StructureL
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 1.740 2.396 2.564 2.735 3.627 4.998 6.681
NonDSmileValuation 1.683 2.501 2.736 2.975 4.165 6.036 8.343
SmileValue 0.056 D0.105 D0.172 D0.240 D0.538 D1.038 D1.661
StructureM
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 1.657 2.286 2.455 2.639 3.516 4.854 6.474
NonDSmileValuation 2.038 2.935 3.160 3.409 4.592 6.332 8.355
SmileValue D0.381 D0.649 D0.705 D0.770 D1.077 D1.478 D1.880
StructureN
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 32.456 45.249 48.898 51.872 64.104 85.288 109.984
NonDSmileValuation 47.629 64.386 68.851 73.598 93.624 120.643 149.417
SmileValue D15.173 D19.136 D19.954 D21.726 D29.520 D35.355 D39.433
StructureO
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 0.833 1.205 1.310 1.440 1.984 2.820 3.920
NonDSmileValuation 2.389 3.516 3.837 4.234 5.919 8.556 12.073
SmileValue D1.556 D2.311 D2.526 D2.794 D3.935 D5.736 D8.153
StructureP
D5 D1 0 1 5 10 15
SmileValuation 10.621 12.846 13.427 14.081 16.827 20.922 25.843
NonDSmileValuation 18.181 22.678 23.824 25.086 30.177 37.117 44.574





































































































































 Type Maturity Strike Barrier




PutK  CallAK  CallBK 
StructureK 30DSepD10 31DDecD10 40 55 60
























Asexpectedvolatilitybrings thebarrier closer in anonDlinearway so the slopeof the skew
shouldbetakenintoaccount.
InadditionthedeltaandthevegaoftheUpandOutcallwilltakenegativevaluesasthevalue
oftheoptionwill jumpdowntozerowhenis in–the–money.Asmarket approachesthe
strike,uptoaspecificpointoptiondeliversmoreandmoredeltaastheprobabilityofexercise


































































Thepayoutoftheupandoutcall tFC , isgivenbytheboundary:
1) ( )+−= 8585.2, FCF if 100≤F 
2) 0
,100 =tC if 85.20 ≤≤ t 
AnaturaldecisionforthefirstconditionisaEuropeancalloptionwithstrike85.Inorderto
matchthe2ndboundaryconditionthefollowingprocessisfollowed:
1) Thelifeoftheoptionisdividedinto N stepswithlength t∆ .
2) AEuropeancalloptionwithstrike100 andmaturity2.85tomatchtheboundaryatthe
point ( )[ ]tN ∆−1,100 .
3) Choose a European call option with strike 100  and maturity ( ) tN ∆−1 to match the
boundaryatthepoint ( )[ ]tN ∆− 2,100 etc.
Note that options are chosen in such a way that their value is zero on the parts of the
boundary that ismatchedby theearlieroption.Theoptiondescribedatpoint2) abovehas















Call16 1.000 85 2.85
Call15 D3.224 100 2.85
Call14 1.183 100 2.66
Call13 0.364 100 2.47
Call12 0.171 100 2.28
Call11 0.099 100 2.09
Call10 0.065 100 1.90
Call9 0.047 100 1.71
Call8 0.036 100 1.52
Call7 0.028 100 1.33
Call6 0.022 100 1.14
Call5 0.019 100 0.95
Call4 0.016 100 0.76
Call3 0.014 100 0.57
Call2 0.012 100 0.38
























 SmileDelta NonDsmileDelta HedgeDelta
D5 0.0042 0.0019 0.0054
D3 0.0049 0.0016 0.0057
D1 0.0051 0.0007 0.0059
0 0.0053 0.0004 0.0059
1 0.0055 0.0001 0.0059
3 0.0058 D0.0006 0.0058
5 0.0064 D0.0008 0.0055
7 0.0066 D0.0012 0.0051
9 0.0068 D0.0014 0.0046
11 0.0068 D0.0015 0.0040

Theportfoliotheperformingalsotohedgethevegaexposureofthebarrieroption.Clearlythe
vega hedging requiresmore dynamic trading of the hedging portfolio in order to bemore
efficient.Hereitshouldbenotedthatthevegadeliveredbythesmileapproachislessvs.the
non– smile valuation as themarket for the specificperiodwas indicatingnegative skewas
describedabove.
Table6.13–VegadeliveredSmile,NonDsmileandHedgingportfolio
 SmileVega NonDsmileVega HedgeVega
D5% D0.0036 D0.0086 D0.0015
D3% D0.0039 D0.0075 D0.0023
0 D0.0043 D0.0065 D0.0066
2% D0.0049 D0.0059 D0.0053











As described by Fusai and Roncoroni (2008) the aim is to estimate the expected value
( )XΕ=θ of a random variable X with distribution XΡ , on the underlying probability
space ( )ΡΩ ,, F .Asamplemeanofthisvariableisanyrandomaveragegivenbythefollowing
equation:












where ( ) ( )( )nXXX ,...,1= is a random vector with independent and identically distributed
componentswith commondistribution XΡ . If ( )nxxx ,...,1= is a sampleof this vector, then
nθˆ canbetakenasanapproximationtothetargetquantityθ foratleasttworeasons.First,this
quantity hasmean θ and variance ( ) nXVar . This suggests that for n sufficiently large, the
estimation nθˆ convergestothetargetquantity,asthelawoflargenumbersstatesthatthisisthe
case. Second, according to the central limit theorem a normalized centered sample means
convergeindistributiontoastandardnormalvariablei.e.

















nz converges pointwise to the cumulative distribution function of aGaussian variable with
zeromeanandvarianceonce.Thenormalizationisperformedbyusingtheunbiasedestimator
ofthemeansquareerror
















The estimation error ( ) θθ −Xnˆ is approximately distributed as a normal ( )nN nσˆ,0 .Given
theabovethesimulationalgorithmtovalueaderivativewithpayDoffattime ( )TTXQT ,, isthe
following:
1. Fixn ”large”.
2. Generate n independentpaths nTtTt xx ,
1
,
,..., and nTtTt yy ,
1
,
,..., ,ofprocesses X andY on [ ]Tt, .
3. Computethediscountfactorandthepay–offovereachpath ( ) ( )[ ]iTtiTt yx ,, , .
4. The present value of the pay – off over each path is given by















5. Returnthesum ( ) ( )nVV ,...,1 dividedbyn .
Inorder to examine theperformanceof the portfolio anumberof 100,000 simulations are












The results for each time interval arepresentedbelow.For the first simulation for the time
intervalbetween2ndMarch2009and24thJuly2009thevalueofthebarrieroptionandthe
valueof eachoptionof thehedgingportfolio,with the initialpositionsarepresentedunder

















































































































































1) Identify n number of nihi ≤≤1, hedging instruments that will be used to hedge the
Bermudanstructurethathasq extensiondateswith qn  .


























marketvolatilityforeachhedginginstrumentand jσ , qj ≤≤1 istheriskoftheBermudan.
4) The weights iw of the hedging instruments are chosen in order to minimize the vega
exposure of the Bermudan structure. The exercise is a straight forward linear algebra
application:













= and ( )Tnwwww ,...,, 21= .
b. Thevegaexposureoftheportfoliois MwU − .
c. Since qn  it is not expected to eliminate qwith n vanilla instruments so the
problem is to minimize the sum of squares of the vega risks i.e.
( ) ( )MwUMwU T −−min (6.29).




a) PartAwillpay ( )+− CallBi KiceMonthly Pr and ( )+− iPut iceMonthlyKx Pr2 .
b) PartyBwillpay ( )+− CallAi KiceMonthly Pr .
Thestrikesarethefollowing 40=PutK , 55=CallAK and 60=CallBK .Thefinalmaturityofthe
tradeisDec–10andtheexercisefrequencyisquarterlywithfirstexerciseMar–09andlast
exerciseSep–10i.e.thestructurehas7possibleextensiondates.
Thevanillaproducts thatarenaturalhedging instruments for thespecific structure,arecaps
withstrikes55and60andfloorswithstrike40.ViewingthehedgingproblemfromParty’sB




































































One of the advantages of the above strategy is that provides a relative goodhedge for the
secondorderriskssuchas VolatilityVega ∂∂ and VolatilityDelta ∂∂ .Graph5.17represents
how the vega exposure of theBermudan structure changeswith respect to volatility. For a
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simulationforthis time interval theestimatedProfitandLoss is–0.633.Inadditionas it is
































estimated Profit and Loss is 0.581 and results are under Table 6.26. The value of the































As indicted by the analysis above the Total Profit and Loss (including both portfolio
management and reDhedging positions) is 0.030. The value generated from the Bermudan
structureacrossallsimulationis–1.514andthehedgingportfolioisgenerating1.544.Oneof






basis interest ratemodelling developments and applies them into a very dynamicmarket in
which the smile impact can be significant. The dynamics of the commodity market are




able to capture accurately the deDcorrelation between the futures contracts and the smile
dynamics.
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with special significant events like the collapse ofmajor financial institutions and the sharp
decline in market liquidity. For the first part three structural form models were studied
Merton’s, Leland –Toft andLongstaff – Schwartz.These specificationswere implemented
usingdifferentassumptionsforvolatilityanddebtmaturitysuchas(i)exogenousvolatilityand
actual bondmaturity, (ii) exogenous volatility and adjustedmaturity, (iii)model determined
volatilityandactualbondmaturityand(iv)modeldeterminedvolatilityandadjustedmaturity.
The process to determine the sample, using the following criteria 1) US  non – financial
corporations, 2) only fixed or zero coupon bonds, 3) all the principal is retired atmaturity
(bullet bonds) 4) bonds with embedded optionalities like callable, convertible, putable are
excluded,5)  floatingDrateorsinkablebondsareexcludedaswell, issimilar to theones that
were followedbyLydenandSaraniti (2000),Teixeira (2005) andEom,HelwegeandHuang
(2002).Toour knowledge it is the first time that themodel is calibrated against these four
alternatives.Furthermore it is important tostate the fact that thehistorical impliedvolatility
wasusedforequity.Atthisfirststagejustpriorthecreditcrunchonlycompanieswithrelative
simple capital structure andmaximumof two bondswere included. The period covered is
January1998untilApril2006.
ResultswereincontrastwithLydenandSaraniti(2000)andWeiandGuo(1997)whoargued
thatMerton’smodel dominatesLongstaff andSchwartz inpredictive accuracy; asLongstaff
andSchwartzmodelrevealedaverygoodperformance..Merton’sandLelandandToftmodels
performondifferentdirections, namelyMertonunderestimates credit spreads,whileLeland
and Toft overestimates credit spreads. Longstaff and Schwartz model predictive power is
reflected to thepredictedoveractualcredit spreadration thatwasgreater than35%for the
majorityofthecompanies.Themodelwasabletoproducearatiopredictedoveractualcredit
spread that is greater than35% for thirteen companies (CARLISLECOS INC,HARMAN
INTL, HUMANA INC, JLG INDUSTRIES, MILLIPORE CORP, NICOR GAS,
NORDSTROMINC,NVRINC,OFFICEMAXINC,POPE&TALBOT,REYNOLDS&
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REYNOLDS, SOUTHERN UNION and WORTHINGTON INDS) when it is
implemented against model determined volatility and adjusted maturity. Furthermore, even
whentherewasanoverpredictionerrorthatwasonlimitedmagnitudeanddefinitelymuchless




theapplicationof theLongstaff andSchwartz (1995)model is appliedalsoon2007–2008
bond data. The assumption of simple capital structure is relaxed and a composite implied
volatility iscalculated.Againthemodelindicatedverygoodperformanceinallcasesproving
anaveragepredictedoveractualcreditspreadratioof57%.Interestinglythoughtheaverage
predicted credit spread was still estimated below the actual one in line with the previous
implementationalthoughtheexplanatorypowerofthemodelincreasedmainlydrivenbythe
highermarketvolatility.
For eight companiesBOWATER INC,CAMPBELL SOUPCO,WITCOCORP, STEEL
DYNAMICS,SONOCOPRODUCTS,SAKSINC,KOHLSCORPandUNISYSCORPthe
predictedoveractualcreditspreadratiowasgreaterthat50%.Fiveofthesecompaniesarenon
investment graded. For the five non investment grade the estimated predicted over actual






















shapes and curvemovements in relation toone– factormodel. In addition,multi – factor
modelsallownon–perfectcorrelationsbetweendifferentcommodityvariablesacharacteristic
that is very important in Oil Market. Finally the dynamics of the commodity market are




The following two general stochastic processes in terms of two independent Brownian
motionsareconsidered:
( )



































The approach described has the flexibility to generate different local volatility surfaces
depending on the calibrated data.Moreover themodel allows defining different correlation
surface.Themodel is used toprice anumberof exotic structures–barrier options,Target
RedemptionNotes andEuropean and Bermudan Swaptions – that are common in the oil













major financial institutions and the sharpdecline inmarket liquidity.Liquidity riskhasbeen
thought tobean important factoraffectingbondpricing.However,measuringand tracking
liquidity spreads remains an elusive task.Oneof themajor obstacles is that liquidity risk is
often confoundedwith effectsofother factors (e.g., default, information andmarket risks),
whicharedifficulttodisentangleempirically.Liquidityisalsoabroadconcept,whichmaybe
referred to as ease of accessing funds or trading assets, or a state factor that systematically
affectsassetpricing.Differentconceptscouldleadtoverydifferentliquiditymetrics.Unlessit
isproperlydefined,measuringandcomparingliquidityeffectscanbeaverychallengingtask.
A specific attention, investigation and analysis need to be given to the impact ofmacro –
factors to the credit spread levels. Under this, there is a need to investigate and identify
approachestodecomposetheliquidityelementtothespreadandthecredit risk.Inaddition
there is a need to analyze the features and characteristics of concentration within market




calculated by taking a suitably weighted average of the individual implied volatilities the
predicted credit spread is improved considerably. Therefore empirical evidence and future




time – varying portfolios. The backward integration approach calibrates to swaptions on
underlying swaps that run from extension date to finalmaturity. Themodel therefore only
168
works for underlyings that run from extension date to final maturity. This holds for all
componentsoftheunderlyingportfolio.Inotherwords,themodeldoesnotsupporttime–
varyingportfolios.Inadditionthemodeldoesnottakeintoaccountsettlementdelayforthe
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